Had it not been primarily for the work of John Robbins and The Trinity Foundation, the legacy and theology of Gordon H. Clark might have largely fallen into obscurity and Clark himself would have remained an unknown figure to many in this new generation of believers. At the present time, there is a small, but ever-growing, movement of believers that is dedicated to rediscovering and promoting the views of Gordon Clark. What these writers, bloggers, podcasters, and pastors have discovered however in their attempt to promote the ideas of Clark is that he has largely been ignored and misrepresented as much as he has been attacked and marginalized. Unfortunately, this has led many people to believe things about Clark that are wrong and it has caused many others to dismiss him without properly understanding his views. Clark is not difficult to understand for those who may wish to read his work for themselves. Moreover, his contributions to the faith are significant and should be given serious consideration. The problem today is that many persist in rejecting Clark and continue to speak out against him while remaining ignorant of what he said and wrote. While many who disagree with Clark profess to have read him, often their bias against him is outweighed only by their ignorance of him. We have encountered many followers of Cornelius Van Til who adamantly disagree with Clark and yet do not understand or represent him accurately. The purpose of this article is to showcase one such example and to present an argument in favor of Clark’s criticism against Van Til’s notion of analogy, as it was presented in “The Complaint.”

Recently Tyler Vela of The Freed Thinker Podcast attempted to argue against Clark’s criticism of Van Til’s notion of analogy and in the process demonstrated his ignorance of Clark and the issue. The discussion ensued shortly after I posted the following comment to the Bible Thumping Wingnut Facebook group.

Original Post

We do not just have an analogy of the truth we have the truth itself, and this in no way harms the Creator/ creature distinction.

This post was meant to express a favorable disposition of Clark’s view with regards to the most disputed theological topic in the Clark-Van Til Controversy. It is possible, however, that some readers may not be familiar with the controversy.

Following in the tradition of his father and grandfather, Clark sought to become an ordained minister in the faith and to that end he was ordained as a teaching elder in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church by the Philadelphia Presbytery on August 9, 1944. But shortly after he was ordained to the ministry, a protest ensued as 12 elders, including Cornelius Van Til, issued a formal complaint against his ordination. These elders produced a document, which came to be known as “The Complaint.” This document, which was read during a meeting of the Presbytery of Philadelphia on November 20, 1944, would lay the groundwork for what later became known as the “Clark-Van Til Controversy.” The document identified four theological topics of the dispute but the main theological point of dispute was over the incomprehensibility of God. This dispute over the incomprehensibility of God was chiefly concerned with the way in which man’s knowledge relates to God’s knowledge.

Doug Douma, author of The Presbyterian Philosopher points out the following:

Van Til used the term "analogy" to describe the relationship between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge… Van Til used "analogy" to mean that man’s knowledge itself is an analogy of God’s knowledge... Echoing Van Til, “The Complaint” declared, "Because of his very nature as infinite and absolute the knowledge which God possesses of himself and of all things must remain a mystery which the finite mind of man cannot penetrate." And in the strongest form possible, the phrase for which “The Complaint” became most well-known, "We dare not maintain that [God's] knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point."

In critiquing Van Til’s theory of analogy, Clark argued that if God’s knowledge has no point in common with ours, then we know nothing that is true, for God knows all truths. In “The Answer,” [a response to “The Complaint”] his arguments for this conclusion is presented; ‘The Presbytery wishes to suggest that if man does not know at least one truth that God knows, if man’s knowledge and God’s knowledge do not coincide in at least one detail, then man knows nothing at all. God knows all truth, and if man’s mind cannot grasp one truth, then man’s mind grasps no truth. Far from being a test of orthodoxy, this test imposed by “The Complaint” is nothing else than skepticism and irrationalism."[i]

Clark argued that skepticism and irrationalism were the results of Van Til’s position. Dr. Gary Crampton has also argued this point against Van Til's notion of analogy. Crampton writes,

...there is the Van Tilian notion of analogy; that is, that all human knowledge is, and can only be, analogical to God’s knowledge. There is no point at which God’s knowledge meets man’s knowledge. Dr. Van Til is not just teaching that there is a difference in the quantity of God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge (a belief with which all Christians should agree), but that there is also a difference in the content of knowledge. Astonishingly, Dr. Van Til writes: Man could not have the same thought content in his mind that God has in His mind unless he were himself divine. Elsewhere he states that man’s knowledge of God and His Word is at no point identical with the content of God’s mind. And it is because of the fact that all human knowledge is only analogical to God’s knowledge that all teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory.

Such a view, if carried to its logical conclusion, would lead to complete skepticism.[ii]

This quote from Crampton’s article was the one that was posted on the original thread in the comments section in the hope that it would explain, in more detail, the position taken with respect to the original post. Crampton points out the same thing Clark himself pointed out, namely that this view of Van Til's leads to skepticism. However, Tyler replied that “the claim that it would lead to skepticism is just absurd because it ignores the fact of revelatory knowledge based on Scriptures.”

In response to Tyler's comments, I stated, “That is the logically necessary result of such a position.” Tyler then challenged me to produce a syllogism to show this to be the case. Tyler wrote, “Without citing ideological articles, can you present the syllogism that shows it is logically NECESSARY?” He then provided his own syllogism which, unfortunately for him, only served to highlight his failure to grasp the substance of the Clarkian criticism. Tyler wrote:

1 What God has revealed, we can know.

2 God has revealed reliable anthropomorphic truths about himself.

Therefore,

We can have reliable anthropomorphic knowledge of God.

I don’t see how that “logically necessitates” skepticism.

The reason Tyler can’t “see how that [syllogism] ‘logically necessitates’ skepticism” is that it doesn’t, and that is not what Clark said would lead to skepticism. Clark never denied the use of analogies or anthropomorphisms in relation to our knowledge of God or anything thing else for that matter. With such confusion, it is no wonder then that Tyler can’t “see how that ‘logically necessitates’ skepticism.” In the original conversation thread, I quoted and agreed with Crampton who wrote, “Such a view, if carried to its logical conclusion, would lead to complete skepticism.” What view was Crampton referring too? Was it that “God has revealed anthropomorphic truths about himself and therefore, we can have reliable anthropomorphic knowledge of God” as Tyler argued in his syllogism? No, it was the view that “all human knowledge is, and can only be, analogical to God’s knowledge.” The contention, which Tyler apparently failed to grasp, was not over analogical knowledge of God but rather over the idea that all of man’s knowledge is analogical and that there is no point at which God’s knowledge meets man’s knowledge. Simply put, Van Til did not do what Tyler has done in that syllogism; that is to limit the use of analogy to our knowledge of God. Van Til wrote, “The fact that man’s knowledge must always remain analogical is applicable to his knowledge of God as well as to his knowledge of the universe.”[iii] Van Til held that all our knowledge was analogical and that is partly what Clarkians argue will lead to skepticism if drawn to its logical conclusion. Unfortunately, this reveals a significant lack of understanding on Tyler’s part. He would later go on to ask, “Does God have a mighty arm or is it [an] analogy? If it is an analogy, does it not teach us anything that we can then know about God? Does that fact that it is analogy mean that we are stuck with abject skepticism of what it means.” Again, this is highly revealing on Tyler’s part.

In order to properly address Tyler’s confusion, we will answer his questions more directly as we consider what Clark wrote about analogy. Then we will address the overlying issue at hand and examine Van Til’s notion of analogy from two different points of consideration. First, we will examine the notion “that all human knowledge is, and can only be, analogical to God’s knowledge.” Then we will examine Van Til’s notion. “that [God’s] knowledge and our knowledge [do not] coincide at any single point.”

Does Analogy automatically lead to “abject skepticism?"

First, let’s look at what Clark wrote and then we can answer Tyler’s questions more directly. Clark wrote,

Of course, there are figures of speech, metaphors, anthropomorphisms, [analogies] and the like. But these would be meaningless if there were no literal statements to give them meaning. For example, 2 Chronicles 16:9 - “The eyes of the Lord run to and fro throughout the whole earth” - is ludicrously ridiculous if taken literally: little eyeballs rolling over the dusty ground. But unless the statement, God is omniscient, is literal, the figure has nothing to refer to.[iv]

Now let’s answer Tyler's questions, “Does God have a mighty arm or is it analogy. If it is analogy, does it not teach us anything that we can then know about God?” Of course, it is an analogy, but unless there is a literal truth, such as God is powerful and mighty, to give it meaning then it tells us nothing about God. Tyler then asked, “Does the fact that it is analogy mean that we are stuck with abject skepticism of what it means.” Again, this is not what Clark or his followers argue will lead to skepticism so the answer is no, not if there is a literal statement to give it meaning. Tyler apparently thinks that Clarkians believe analogy automatically leads to skepticism. If he had read Clark for himself then he may have read when Clark wrote the following.

Those who defend the Bible as a true revelation must insist that it conveys literal truth. This does not mean the God cannot sometimes use symbolism and metaphor [or analogy]. Of course, there is symbolism in Ezekiel, there are parables in the gospels, and there are metaphors scattered throughout. God might have used even mythology and fable. But unless there are literal statements along with these figures of speech - or at the very least, unless figures of speech can be translated into literal truth - a book conveys no definite meaning.

Let a person say that the cross symbolizes the love of God. However, if all language or all religious language is symbolical, the statement that the cross symbolizes the love of God is itself a symbol. A symbol of what? When this last question is answered, we shall find that this answer is again a symbol. Then another symbol will be needed, and another. And the whole process will be meaningless.

This contemporary theory of language is open to the same objections that were raised against the Thomistic [and the Van Tilian] notion of analogical knowledge. In order to have meaning, an analogy, a metaphor, or a symbol must be supported by some literal truth. If Samson was as strong as an ox, then an ox must literally be strong. If Christ is the lion of the tribe of Judah, then something must be literally true about lions and about Christ also. No matter with what literary embellishment the comparison be made there must be a strictly true statement that has given rise to it. And a theory that says all language is symbolic is a theory that cannot be taken as literally true.[v]

Clearly then, Clark did not reject the use of analogy, symbolism, or anthropomorphism. Nor did he claim that analogical or anthropomorphic descriptions of God would automatically lead to skepticism. This level of confusion and ignorance raises suspicion for one who claims to have read both sides. Tyler is without excuse because he was encouraged to, “read some Gordon Clark,” to which he replied, “I have read Clark.” After I quoted Crampton I stated that Clark had already refuted Van Til’s notion of analogy to which Tyler responded by saying, “‘Refuted’ is FAR too strong a term btw. Almost laughably so to anyone who had read both sides.” Is it not “the fool [who] rages and laughs.” (Proverbs 29:9) Tyler ought to be careful if he finds himself tempted to laugh at Clark or his followers. But perhaps he was merely posturing in the discussion when he claimed to have read both sides. After this encounter with Tyler, I seriously doubt he has read both sides.

All of this is to merely to highlight Tyler's confusion and what many Van Tilians tend to do in discussions about Clark. Their obstinacy toward Clark is outweighed only by their ignorance of Clark. But Tyler did request a Syllogism to demonstrate that Van Til’s view of analogy logically necessitated skepticism.

All Human Knowledge Is Analogical

It would appear by and large that when Van Tilians make the claim that all of man’s knowledge is analogical to God’s knowledge they intend for this proposition to be regarded as something that is literally true. However, we can provide a syllogism to show that this is only can only be an analogy.

Premise 1: All man's knowledge is analogical to God’s Knowledge

Premise 2: "All man's knowledge is analogical to God's knowledge" is a knowledge claim made by a man

Conclusion: Therefore "all man's knowledge is analogical to God's knowledge" is an analogy.

Clark had already pointed this out when he wrote:

On the complainants’ theory, the proposition “the truth man has is analogical” is itself only an analogy. It is not the truth that God has. Nor could man know that it was God who was revealing such a proposition, for again the proposition “God is revealing that truth is analogical” is only an analogy of the truth. ("The Answer" Pg 22)

If this proposition, all man’s knowledge is analogical, is not to be regarded as literally true then it must be analogous to something that is literally true. To understand the analogy, we must also know and understand the literal truth which gives it meaning. It is important to recognize that the truth of Jesus’ parables was obscured from those who were not given the literal meaning of the parable. In Luke 8:4-8 we read the parable of the sower.

⁴ And when a great crowd was gathering and people from town after town came to him, he said in a parable, ⁵ "A sower went out to sow his seed. And as he sowed, some fell along the path and was trampled underfoot, and the birds of the air devoured it. ⁶ And some fell on the rock, and as it grew up, it withered away, because it had no moisture. ⁷ And some fell among thorns, and the thorns grew up with it and choked it. ⁸ And some fell into good soil and grew and yielded a hundredfold." As he said these things, he called out, "He who has ears to hear, let him hear.

Jesus gives the parable and it is clear from the text that nobody understood what it meant until he provided the literal meaning of the parable. In verses 9-10 we read, "⁹ And when his disciples asked him what this parable meant, ¹⁰ he said, 'To you it has been given to know the secrets of the kingdom of God, but for others they are in parables, so that 'seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not understand.'" All that the “others” were given was a parable or an analogy, and although they heard they did not understand. If all we have is an analogy with no support or connection to a literal truth then we are no better off than these people. Therefore, Jesus had to take his disciples aside and give them the literal meaning of the parable so that they might understand.

¹¹ Now the parable is this: The seed is [analogous to] the word of God. ¹² The ones along the path are [analogous to] those who have heard; then the devil [the birds are an analogy of the devil] comes and takes away the word from their hearts, so that they may not believe and be saved. ¹³ And the ones on the rock are [analogous to] those who, when they hear the word, receive it with joy. But these have no root; they believe for a while, and in time of testing fall away. ¹⁴ And as for what fell among the thorns, they are [analogous to] those who hear, but as they go on their way they are choked by the cares and riches and pleasures of life, and their fruit does not mature. ¹⁵ As for that in the good soil, they are [analogous to] those who, hearing the word, hold it fast in an honest and good heart, and bear fruit with patience. (Luke 8:9-15)

It’s also important to remember that we can draw a valid deduction from a false premise. As a Clarkian, I'm not interested in defending Van Til’s irrational notion of analogy and I would argue that the first premise is false. I do not believe that all of man’s knowledge is analogical. Here I'm going to give Tyler an ad hominem reply and accept the first premise as true for the sake of argument. Unfortunately, however, before we can proceed any further, we must correct a very common misunderstanding, one which Tyler has previously made, that all ad hominem replies are fallacious. Here we must caution the would-be philosopher to avoid making this mistake. Gordon Clark wrote:

ad hominem – Latin meaning “to the man.” A form of argument that accepts a proposition espoused by another for the purpose of deducing from it contradictory propositions or propositions that would be rejected by the other person. AD HOMINEM SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE INFORMAL FALLACY OF ABUSIVE AD HOMINEM. (Emphasis Clark’s)[vi]

Clark rightly distinguished between an ad hominem reply and an abusive ad hominem fallacy. This view, though largely misunderstood, is not particular to Clark. I am going to accept the proposition “all man’s knowledge is analogical to God’s knowledge,” which accurately reflects Van Til’s notion of analogy, for the purpose of deducing from it contradictory propositions or propositions that would be rejected by Tyler. First, we will use the Modus Ponens syllogism to show it to be self-contradictory if it is to be taken as literally true. Then we will use the Modus Tollens syllogism to reduce it to absurdity if it is not to be taken as literally true. Since we have shown that the claim, “all man’s knowledge is analogical to God’s knowledge” is itself an analogy we can proceed to show that it is self-contradictory if the Van Tilian intends for it to be taken as literally true. To do this we will use of a Modus Ponens syllogism.

Premise 1: (If P) If the claim "all human knowledge is analogical to God's knowledge" is an analogy (then Q) then it cannot be literally true.

Premise: 2 (P) The claim is an analogy

Conclusion: (Therefore Q) Therefore it cannot be literally true.

It would appear that the Van Tilian claim, that all knowledge is analogical, is to be regarded as literally true. If that is the case then it is clearly self-contradictory and therefore self-refuting. We should also point out that the mind is compelled to reject contradictions because we are made in the image of God and it is only by suppressing the truth that they are maintained and professed. However, if the knowledge claim itself is not literal but analogical then it must be supported by some literal truth if it is to convey any truth or meaning. We can show by using the Modus Tollens syllogism how this is reduced to absurdity and leads to a position that Tyler and every other Van Tilian would reject.

Premise 1: (If P) If this analogy "all human knowledge is analogical to God's knowledge" is to convey any truth or meaning (then Q) then it must be supported by some literal truth which is knowable to man.

Premise 2: (Not Q) No literal truth is accessible to man for all of man’s knowledge is analogical

Conclusion: (Therefore Not P) therefore this analogy conveys no truth or meaning.

First, we showed that Van Til’s notion of analogy is itself an analogy. Then we gave an ad hominem reply and accepted the position as true so for the sake of argument in order to show it to be either self-contradictory or absurd. We used the Modus Ponens syllogism to show that if this analogy is to be regarded as literally true then it is self-contradictory and therefore must be false. We then used the Modus Tollens syllogism to show that if it is not to be regarded as literal but rather it is analogical then it is reduced to absurdity on the account that it conveys not truth or meaning. Certainly, Tyler would reject these propositions, which have been properly deduced from Van Til’s theory of analogy.

No Point of Coincidence

By this point, the problem with Van Til's notion of analogy should clear but let’s take it a little further and address some of Tyler’s other points. Tyler argued,

Again, do the analogies contained within scripture not teach us real truth? As a Clarkian, IF your argument were valid, [Clark’s arguments are valid] you would have just undermined all truths of scripture learned via analogy, anthropomorphism, metaphor, symbolism, etc. You see the irony of a Clarkian doing that? If a Clarkian wants to say that analogous knowledge has no truth value then they have undermined ALL non-didactic/straight historic sections of the scripture as having any truth value.

First, we need to point out again that the Clarkian criticism is not leveled against the use of analogy itself, but rather it is leveled against Van Til's theory of analogy. If Tyler understood this then he wouldn’t be asking such questions. Tyler stated, “IF your argument were valid [they are valid], you would have just undermined all truths of scripture learned via analogy, anthropomorphism, metaphor, symbolism, etc. You see the irony of a Clarkian doing that right?” The true irony in all this is that it was Van Til's notion of analogy that undermined “all truths of scripture learned via analogy, anthropomorphism, metaphor, symbolism, etc.” Again, no Clarkian is saying that “analogous knowledge has no truth value” and we have not undermined “ALL non-didactic/straight historic sections of the scripture” because neither Clark nor his followers have rejected the use of analogy or made the claim that it has “no truth value.”

Tyler doesn’t understand the substance of the debate especially when he makes comments like the following:

Just because I don't believe we have knowledge in the same way that God has knowledge doesn't entail skepticism, let alone make it "logically necessary.”

This shows once again that Tyler does not grasp the actual issue. Clarkians also “don't believe we have knowledge in the same way that God has knowledge,” and neither do we believe that this is what will, “entail skepticism, let alone make it ‘logically necessary.’” Dr. Reymond wrote, “It is important to note here that it is not the way that God and human beings know a thing that "The Complaint" declares is different. Both the complaints and Clark agreed that God knows everything by eternal intuition whereas people learn what they know (excluding certain innate ideas) discursively. Rather, insists Van Til and certain of his students, it is the content of man’s knowledge that is qualitatively distinct from God’s knowledge.”[vii]

"The Complaint" which declared, “We dare not maintain that [God’s] knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point,” also stated that it was a “tragic fact” that Clark’s position, “has lead him to obliterate the qualitative distinction between the contents of the divine mind and the knowledge which is possible to the creature.” In other words, Van Til and his cohorts accused Clark of harming the Creator/ creature distinction and insisted that in order to maintain that distinction we must maintain that our knowledge does not coincide with God’s knowledge at any single point. This is what the actual issue was over. So let’s take a closer look at these positions.

The problem that Van Til faced was similar to, if not the same, to that of Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) with respect to his theory of analogy. Aquinas was the first theologian to propose the use of analogy as a way of explaining the relation of being between God and man. This point of criticism against Van Til by way of comparison to Aquinas is nothing new and most well informed Van Tilians are aware of it. Dr. Scott Oliphint has stated the following.

Van Til’s notion of “analogy” or “analogical,” as it applies to knowledge and to predication, is central to his theology and apologetic.  Though the term itself is confusing in that it carries with it a host of assumptions in Thomism, it should not be confused or in any way identified with Thomas’s understanding of analogy.  Though for Thomas there was an analogy of being, for Van Til, the notion of analogy was meant to communicate the ontological and epistemological difference between God and man.  This difference has been expressed historically in terms of an archetypal/ ectypal relationship.[viii]

Despite all attempts by Van Til’s disciples to rescue his theory of analogy from criticism by distinguishing it from that of Thomas Aquinas’ the problem of skepticism still persisted. Let’s take a moment to ask why as we examine the issue. Dr. Oliphint pointed out that for Thomas there was an analogy of being which is to say that he held that nothing can be predicated of God and man in a univocal sense. Dr. Reymond points out, “A given predicate applied to separate subjects [such as God and man] univocally would intend that the subjects possess the predicate in a precisely identical sense.”[ix] This is why we cannot say for example, that both God and man are “intelligent, good or upright” in a univocal sense. This would imply that both God and man possess the predicates “intelligent, good or upright” in a precisely identical sense and Aquinas recognized that this would destroy the Creator-creature distinction.

However, the opposite of univocality is equivocality and it has its own problem. A given predicate applied to separate subjects equivocally would intend that the subjects possess the predicate in a completely unrelated and altogether different sense. Aquinas also understood that to suggest that God and man are “intelligent, good or upright” in a completely equivocal sense would result in utter skepticism for it would be completely ambiguous. In sum, a complete univocality destroys the Creator-creature distinction while a complete equivocality results in skepticism. Therefore, Aquinas proposed the use of “proportionality or analogy” as a third option for univocality and equivocality. This means that when we say, for example, that “God and man are intelligent,” it is analogical in the sense that God’s intelligence is proportional to God’s intelligence as man’s intelligence is proportional to man’s intelligence and it also means that the “intelligence” intended cannot be the same for both God and man. This sounds all well and good until we remember that Aquinas held that nothing could be predicated in the univocal sense between God and man. But why is this a problem? It is because the only thing that can keep an analogy from becoming a complete equivocality is the univocal element that is implicit within it. Dr. Reymond points out,

If I assert that an analogy may be drawn between an apple and an orange, do I not intend to suggest that the apple and the orange, obviously different in some respects, are the same in at least one respect? Why otherwise would I draw attention to the relationship between them? While it is true that the one respect in which I perceive that they are similar will not be immediately apparent to anyone else without further explanation on my part, it should be clear nonetheless to everyone, if I asserted that they are analogous one to the other, that I believe that in some sense a univocal feature exists between them--in this case, it may be that I have in mind that they are both fruit, or that they are both spherical, or that they both have extension in space and have mass. I intend to suggest that, for all their differences, they have something in common.[x]

The same is true for the univocal elements which are implicit in the parable of the sower. Christ was asserting that an analogy can be drawn between a seed and the word of God. To borrow the language of Dr. Reymond, Christ is clearly suggesting to his disciples that the seed and the word of God, although different in many ways, are the same in at least one respect. Why else would he be drawing their attention to them? It is true that the one respect in which Jesus perceive that the seed and the word of God are similar was not immediately apparent to anyone else without further explanation on his part but “it should be clear nonetheless to everyone, if [Christ] asserted that they are analogous one to the other, that [he did] believe that in some sense a univocal feature exist between them.” In this case, it is that both the word of God and the seed must take root and grow in good soil in order to have the proper effects of life, growth and bearing fruit. The univocal features for the rest of the parable are further explained by Christ. For example, the univocal feature between the birds and the devil is that they both come to take away the seed. The univocal feature between those whom the path represents and the path itself is that they both have left the seed open to attack. That is to say that they have heard the word, which has fallen on deaf ears, just as if the seed has fallen on the ground by the wayside. The word of God has not sunk into their hearts and minds just as the seed has not sunk into the ground. These people hear the word of God, do not care, do not meditate on it or think deeply about it, and are altogether intellectually shallow. So then, the word of God, which the seed, represents is left open to attack and the word is easily plucked out by the devil who snatches it away like a bird snatches the seed from the ground.

Is it not obvious then, that for all the differences between these subjects if an analogy is drawn between them then there must be something that is equally true of both of them. It is the predicate that indicates that they have something in common. The problem with Aquinas was that he denied any univocal coincidence in prediction between God and man. Therefore, he could not avoid equivocality because he could not account for the univocal elements within his theory of analogy. Van Til’s view faced the same problem, for he held that all of man’s knowledge was analogical to God’s knowledge and God’s knowledge and our knowledge did not coincide at any single point. This did not allow for any univocal element within his view of analogy and therefore he could avoid total equivocality. Dr. Reymond writes, “It is difficult to see how, with his explicit rejection of the univocal element (see his “corresponds at no single point”) in man’s so-called “analogical” knowledge of God, Van Til can rescue such knowledge from being in actuality a total equivocality and no true knowledge at all. Doug Douma points out that Paul Moser is quoted as saying, “Admittedly, Van Til’s theory of analogy is not identical with that of Thomas; but the distinction between the two is not one that commends Van Til’s theory; for his view if held consistently, implies pure equivocism.”[xi]

To be sure, and to satisfy Tyler’s demands for a syllogism, for otherwise, he may not see the points being made, let’s give another ad hominem reply. Let’s accept the position that Van Til and the other faculty members who signed "The Complaint" put forth for the sake of argument and deduce from it propositions that Tyler would be forced to reject. We can show this by virtue of two Modus Tollens syllogism.

Premise 1: (If P) If man is to knows any truth at all (Then Q) then man’s knowledge must coincide with God’s knowledge at some point for God knows all truth.

Premise 2: (Not Q) Man’s knowledge does not coincide with God’s knowledge at any single point.

Conclusion: (Therefore Not P) Therefore man does not know any truth at all.

Premise 1: (If P) If Van Til’s notion of analogy is to keep from becoming a complete equivocality (Then Q) then his notion of analogy must allow for a univocal feature to be contained within an analogy

Premise 2: (Not Q) Van Til’s notion of analogy does not allow for a univocal feature to be contained within an analogy

Conclusion: (Therefore Not P) Therefore Van Til’s notion of analogy cannot keep from becoming a complete equivocality.

Conclusion

Certainly, much more could be said on this but for now this will suffice. It is worth noting that perhaps Aquinas’ theory of analogy could have been salvaged if he instead held that nothing can be predicated of God and man in a completely univocal sense. Perhaps too, Van Til’s theory of analogy could have been salvaged during the controversy if he would have allowed for a point of coincidence between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. Unfortunately, however, that was not the case and it is why Clark said, “Unless the analogy is based on a literal and univocal similarity, there could be no analogy at all. And I would use this argument to pay my respects to Thomas Aquinas and Cornelius Van Til.” (Clark - Language, Truth, and Revelation, Part 1, minute 27)[xii] It is likely that Van Til and the other complainants felt the full weight of Clark’s criticism because they later conceded to his arguments and accepted a “point of contact” between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. They also attempted to change the definition of “content.” Clark’s criticism was utterly devastating![xiii]

It is worth noting that it was here on this hill of analogy that Van Til so fervently fought against the ordination of Gordon Clark. This was the hill the complainants erected and it was the hill they defended during the controversy. Let the reader of this article note that I, a Clarkian, have just used "hill" as an analogy for "theological position." When we draw out the Van Til position, as established by "The Complaint," to its logical conclusion we are left with skepticism. This is the Clarkian position and more importantly, it is the Biblical position.

[i] DOUMA, DOUG J. "The Arguments of The Ordination Controversy." PRESBYTERIAN PHILOSOPHER. S.l.: WIPF & STOCK PUB, 2017. 112-14. Print.

[ii] Crampton, W. Gary. "Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis." Trinity Foundation. Trinity Foundation, June-July 2000. Web. 02 June 2017. <http://trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=128>.

[iii] Til, Cornelius Van. A Survey of Christian Epistemology. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980.Presuppositionalism 101. Web. Apr.-May 2017. <https://presupp101.wordpress.com/downloads/>.

[iv] Clark, Gordon Haddon. God's Hammer: The Bible and Its Critics. Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2011. Print

[v]. Clark, Gordon Haddon. God's Hammer: The Bible and Its Critics. Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2011. Print.

[vi] Clark, Gordon Haddon. Logic. Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2004. Print.

[vii] Reymond, Robert L. A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith. Second ed. Nashville: T. Nelson, 2001. Print.

[viii] Til, Cornelius Van, and K. Scott Oliphint. The Defense of the Faith. Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Pub., 2008. 62. Print.

[ix] Reymond, Robert L. A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith. Second ed. Nashville: T. Nelson, 2001. Print.

[x] Reymond, Robert L. A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith. Second ed. Nashville: T. Nelson, 2001. Print.

[xi] DOUMA, DOUG J. "The Arguments of The Ordination Controversy." PRESBYTERIAN PHILOSOPHER. S.l.: WIPF & STOCK PUB, 2017. 112-14. Print.

[xii] This quote was found by Doug Douma and provide in the footnotes of his book.

[xiii] For more information on the change in Van Til’s position the reader of this article is encouraged to read: DOUMA, DOUG J. "Chapter 8, The Continued Controversy and Its Results."PRESBYTERIAN PHILOSOPHER. S.l.: WIPF & STOCK PUB, 2017. 157-62. Print.

In part 1 we proposed first that the four-way division of Alexander's empire must have been established after 288 B.C., before which there were still five family lines in contention for his dominions, but prior to 281 B.C. at the Battle of Corupedium, after which only three family lines remained. We proposed, as well, that the four-way division of his empire "toward the four winds of heaven" (Daniel 8:8, 11:4)—would have been established at that time such that Thrace and Asia Minor (within the Taurus mountains) would constitute the northern kingdom, Egypt's territories the southern, Syria and beyond to Babylon the eastern, and Macedonia the western. Historically, biblical scholars in general and eschatologists in particular have struggled with the identification of the territories of Alexander's successors. The cause of the struggle is not difficult to understand. While Asia Minor with Thrace appears, at the outset, to be the Northern kingdom, and Egypt the Southern in accordance with Daniel 11:4, the detailed prophecy of a conflict between the kings of the North and South starting in 11:5 appears to have been fulfilled in the wars between the East and the South—that is, between the Seleucids in Syria and the Ptolemies in Egypt. Neither Daniel nor his angelic narrator pause to explain why.

The Inadequacy of the Shifting Frame

That apparent inconsistency has led to some rather creative cartography in the history of Danielic eschatology through the introduction of a Shifting Frame of Reference. In Daniel 11:4, Asia Minor with Thrace appears to be the northern kingdom in what we might call an Alexandrian Frame of Reference, centered as it is on Alexander's former domains. Then, between Daniel 11:4 and 11:5, the frame of reference suddenly and inexplicably changes, and from that point forward (so the theories go), Syria is the Northern kingdom. We call this the Judæan Frame of Reference, centered as it is on Judæa, with Syria to the North, and Egypt to the South.

Jerome's Use of the Shifting Frame

Jerome (347 – 420 A.D.) was the first patristic writer to attempt to solve the inconsistency between the prophecy and its fulfillment through the introduction of a Shifting Frame of Reference. After identifying "Asia Minor and Pontus and of the other provinces in that whole area" as "the north" in Daniel 11:4, Jerome reasoned that Daniel must have changed his frame of reference in the next verse “because Judaea lay in a midway position” between Syria and Egypt (Jerome, Commentary on Daniel, 11:4-5). There is hardly a commentary on Daniel 11 that does not in some way invoke that Judæan Frame of Reference to solve the difficulty.

Calvin's Use of the Shifting Frame

Calvin appealed to that shifting frame of reference in similar fashion. In his commentary on Daniel 8:8, Calvin described the division of the empire in an Alexandrian Frame of Reference. Cassander was to the west in Macedonia, Ptolemy was to the south in Egypt, while "the kingdom of Persia, which was possessed by Seleucus, was towards the east and united with Syria; the kingdom of Asia [Minor] was to the north" (Calvin, Commentary on Daniel 8:8; see Figure 1, below).

But when Calvin commented on Daniel 11, he shifted to a Judæan Frame of Reference. Macedonia was still West and Egypt was still South, but Asia Minor was now East, and Syria had become North, "[f]or Egypt was situated to the south of Judea, and Syria to the north"(Calvin, Commentary on Daniel, 11:4; see Figure 2, below).

The Underlying Invalid Assumption

From Jerome to Calvin, and for many centuries beyond, the Shifting Frame of Reference in chapter 11 has been a staple of Danielic eschatology. We have been told that the frame of reference simply must have changed mid-prophecy, for that is the only way to make sense of wars foreseen to occur between North and South, but apparently fulfilled between East and South.

In truth, however, the difficulty is of our own making. The underlying issue that has made the Shifting Frame of Reference an eschatological necessity is the invalid assumption that the appellation "king of the north" must be dynastic in nature, attached to a family line. If we assume that "king of the north" refers to a family line, then "the north" of necessity must refer only to the Seleucids—making Syria "north" regarding the wars, even though it is "east" regarding the division. However, as we argued in part 1, the appellation should rather be a geographic one, attached not to a family line but to a territory. Under that rubric, the title "king of the north" would only attach to whomever was the rightful king over the northern territory.

The "Northern Period" of the Seleucids

Such a situation as we have described compels us to reevaluate how Daniel 11 is interpreted, for the geographic data invalidate the Shifting Frame that has for almost two thousand years informed our understanding of Daniel 11. To illustrate the significance of such a change, we will walk through the verses that refer to the "king of the north." In doing so we will refer often to the commentary of Jerome because his geographic errors are of great consequence and have had an inordinate influence on the later commentaries. As we have affirmed and will here demonstrate, "king of the north" applies to the Seleucids only when they reign in Asia Minor, i.e., during periods when they hold the double crown, both East and North.

Daniel 11:6

"And in the end of years they shall join themselves together; for the king’s daughter of the south shall come to the king of the north to make an agreement ..."

It is 252 B.C.. The "king of the north" is Antiochus II, the third generation of Seleucid kings to claim the northern territory. The "king's daughter of the south" is Berenice, daughter of Ptolemy II, king of Egypt. Here Jerome committed one of his several geographic mistakes by assuming that Antiochus II must have been ruling in Syria at the time of the fulfillment (Jerome, Commentary on Daniel, 11:6). As we noted last week, Antiochus II was actually reigning in Ephesus with his wife, Laodice, when Ptolemy II approached him to offer his daughter in marriage. Antiochus II only relocated to Antioch after the agreement with Ptolemy, in order to set up a second household with Berenice. Antiochus was truly "king of the north," that is, Asia Minor and Thrace, when Berenice was offered to him, and as we noted last week, he maintained a household in Ephesus, and eventually abandoned Berenice in Antioch and returned to his first love in Asia Minor.

Daniel 11:7

"But out of a branch of her roots shall one stand up in his estate, which shall come with an army, and shall enter into the fortress of the king of the north, and shall deal against them, and shall prevail:"

It is 246 B.C.. The "branch of her roots" refers to Berenice's brother, Ptolemy III. Their father, Ptolemy II, had since died, and Berenice and her child by Antiochus II had been murdered at the instigation of Laodice (Appian, History of Rome, The Syrian Wars, 65). Antiochus II, now dead, left his son, Seleucus II, reigning in Ephesus with his mother, Laodice. It is here again that Jerome, following Porphyry, makes significant geographic mistake, assuming under a Judæan Frame of Reference that Seleucus II must have been reigning in Antioch at the time:

"He [Ptolemy III] came up with a great army and advanced into the province of the king of the North, that is Seleucus [II] Callinicus, who together with his mother Laodice was ruling in Syria" (Jerome, Commentary on Daniel, 11:7-9)

The truth is, the ascension of Seleucus II occurred not in Syria, but rather in Asia Minor where Antiochus II died, and where Seleucus II had been under the care of his mother, Laodice, since Antiochus' marriage to Berenice (Eusebius, Chronicle [p. 249-51]).

After the murder of his sister, Ptolemy III could not stand idly by, so he launched an all out offensive against the Seleucids. The commentaries typically focus only on Ptolemy III's eastern offensive, in which he "secured for himself the whole country from Taurus to India, without a single engagement” (Polyænus, Strategems, Book 8, Chapter 50.1). That campaign is typically taken to be the fulfillment of Daniel's prophecy that the king of the south "shall enter into the fortress of the king of the north, and shall deal against them, and shall prevail," but such an interpretation assumes a Judæan Frame of Reference in which Syria is north. In an Alexandrian Frame of Reference in which Asia Minor is north, Ptolemy would have invaded Asia Minor and Thrace where the Seleucids currently lived. The historical record shows that he did exactly that.

In this war, Ptolemy III launched an invasion not only in the east, but also in the north, subduing major parts of Thrace and Asia Minor. Ptolemy III's offensive is thus described in the historical record as a “campaign against the two lands of Asia” (Canopus Decree, 6), both Major and Minor, East and North. In this campaign against the house of Seleucus, Ptolemy III had "become master of ... Pamphylia and Ionia [in Asia Minor] and the Hellespont and Thrace..." (The Adoulis Inscription, Orientis graeci inscriptiones selectae (OGIS) 54). Truly, the king of the south had "enter[ed] into the fortress of the king of the north," capturing both Sardis and Ephesus in his northern campaign (Eusebius, Chronicle [p. 249-51]).

Daniel 11:8-9

"And shall also carry captives into Egypt their gods, with their princes, and with their precious vessels of silver and of gold; and he shall continue more years than the king of the north. So the king of the south shall come into his kingdom, and shall return into his own land."

It is about 241 B.C., and Ptolemy III the victor returns to Egypt with his accumulated treasures. The commentaries typically refer here to Ptolemy's conquest of the east and the return of eastern treasures to Egypt. We simply highlight here, from the Adoulis Inscription referenced above, that Ptolemy had conquered not only the whole east, but also major portions of the north, returning to Egypt with the treasures from both kingdoms:

“Having become master of all the land this side of the Euphrates and of Cilicia and Pamphylia and Ionia and the Hellespont and Thrace and of all the forces and Indian elephants in these lands, and having made subject all the princes in the (various) regions, he crossed the Euphrates river and after subjecting to himself Mesopotamia and Babylonia and Sousiana and Persis and Media and all the rest of the land up to Bactria and having sought out all the temple belongings that had been carried out of Egypt by the Persians and having brought them back with the rest of the treasure from the (various) regions he sent his forces to Egypt through the canals that had been dug.” (The Adoulis Inscription, OGIS 54).

It is only after invading both the East and the North that the southern king brought back the accumulated treasures to Egypt, and those treasures included the spoils of Asia Minor and Thrace, the northern kingdom.

A Brief Interlude

In Ptolemy III's incursion into Asia Minor and Thrace, the Seleucids had been pushed as far north as Smyrna, where we find Seleucus II in 242 B.C. making his preparations to cross into Syria to recover his Eastern kingdom from Ptolemy III (Bagnall, Roger S., Derow, Peter, The Hellenistic Period: Historical Sources in Translation, Smyrnaean Inscription (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, ©2004) 56-62). The war in Syria does not go well and Seleucus II “despatched a letter to his brother Antiochus" in Asia Minor requesting help. Instead, Antiochus simply usurps the throne from Seleucus II and claims Asia Minor as his own. Seleucus II was forced to secure a hasty truce from Ptolemy III and returned to Asia Minor to deal with his rebellious younger brother (Justinus’ Epitome of the Philippic History, Book XXVII.2). The rivalry ended in catastrophe for the Seleucid line. When all the dust had settled, the Seleucids had been overthrown from the north, and King Attalus of Pergamon "had appropriated all [the Seleucid] dominions on this side of the Taurus" in Asia Minor (Polybius, The Histories, Book 4.48.7). Both Seleucus II, and his younger brother died outside of Asia Minor as exiles (Justinus’ Epitome of the Philippic History, Book XXVII.4).

Quite notably, and very much to our point, the angel completely skips over this brief period of Seleucid exile from Asia Minor, making no mention of these events in chapter 11. When the angel takes up the narrative with the sons of Seleucus II, they are in exile as their father had been, and making plans to take back the northern kingdom from Attalus. As we shall see, the angel withholds from them the title "king of the north" until after Asia Minor is back in the hands of the House of Seleucus.

Daniel 11:10

"But his sons shall be stirred up, and shall assemble a multitude of great forces: and one shall certainly come, and overflow, and pass through: then shall he return, and be stirred up, even to his fortress."

It is now 226 B.C.. Fifteen years have elapsed since verse 9. Seleucus II has died, and his sons are still in exile. Upon taking the crown, the elder son Seleucus III "crossed the Taurus at the head of a great army" to recover his father's former dominions, but soon perished. His kinsman, Achæus, sent immediately for Antiochus III to come to Asia Minor from the East and take his fallen brother's crown and throne.

While he waited for Antiochus III to arrive in Asia Minor, Achæus continued the mission and "recovered the whole of the country on this side of Taurus." In an act of deference, Achæus initially refused to take the crown, "holding the throne for the younger brother Antiochus [III]" (Polybius, The Histories, Book 4.48.6-10). Upon his ascension, Antiochus III "began to reign, entrusting the government of Asia on this side of Taurus to Achaeus and that of the upper provinces to Molon and his brother Alexander, Molon being satrap of Media and Alexander of Persia" (Polybius, The Histories, Book 5.40.6). With his kingdom so arranged Antiochus III turns his attention to Ptolemy III and the task of taking Coele-Syria.

It is now 220 B.C., and Ptolemy III has died, succeeded by Ptolemy IV. Antiochus III has assembled his army and is "ready and eager to invade Coele-Syria" (Polybius, The Histories, Book 5.42.9). But there is a significant matter requiring the king's attention: Ptolemy IV still occupies "Seleucia which was the capital seat and, one might almost say, the sacred hearth of their empire." The Syrian city "had been garrisoned by the kings of Egypt ever since ... the murder of Berenice" (Polybius, The Histories, Book 5.58.1-9). Convinced by his generals of the importance of the city, Antiochus III sets aside his designs on Coele-Syria, and instead takes back Seleucia in 219 B.C. (Polybius, The Histories, Book 5.60-61).

Thus were Seleucus II's sons both "stirred up" to assemble a multitude of forces, but only one actually returned, and was "stirred up, even to his fortress."

Daniel 11:11

"And the king of the south shall be moved with choler, and shall come forth and fight with him, even with the king of the north: and he shall set forth a great multitude; but the multitude shall be given into his hand"

The year is 217 B.C.. After some initial victories in Coele-Syria (Polybius, The Histories, Book 5.70-71), Antiochus III presses on to Raphia where Ptolemy IV destroys his forces in a decisive battle:

"His losses in killed alone had amounted to nearly ten thousand footmen and more than three hundred horsemen, while more than four thousand had been taken prisoners." (Polybius, The Histories, Book 5.86.5)

Antiochus III sues for peace, and turns his attention back to Asia Minor where Achæus has rebelled, but with only moderate success because the army refused to support him against "their original and natural king" (Polybius, The Histories, Book 5.57.6). Antiochus III pursues Achæus to Sardis, captures him, and executes him for his crime (Polybius, The Histories, Book 8.21). The year is 213 B.C..

Daniel 11:12

"And when he hath taken away the multitude, his heart shall be lifted up; and he shall cast down many ten thousands: but he shall not be strengthened by it."

The outcome of Ptolemy IV's decisive victory against Antiochus III yields the opposite of what he expected back home in Egypt. His army, emboldened by its victory, turned on Ptolemy IV and seceded, taking Upper Egypt with them (Polybius, The Histories, Book 5.107.1-3). What is more, his victory at Raphia did not secure his possession of Coele-Syria, for Antiochus III would eventually return and take it from him.

Daniel 11:13

"For the king of the north shall return, and shall set forth a multitude greater than the former, and shall certainly come after certain years with a great army and with much riches."

In the years since his defeat at Raphia, Antiochus III has not been idle. He is still governing as king of Asia Minor, as evidenced by his letters to the people at Sardis in 213 B.C. (Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum: 39.1283-12856). In 205 B.C. he is resettling "two thousand families of Jews" from Mesopotamia and Babylon to Phrygia and Lydia, in the interior of Asia Minor, being "persuaded that they will be well-disposed guardians of our possessions" there (Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book 12, chapter 147). In 204 B.C., he receives the adulation of the city of Teos on the western coast of Asia Minor "concerning the foundation of the cult in honor of King Antiochos III" and his wife, the queen ("Divine Honors for Antiochos and Laodike at Teos and Iasos," Franciszek Sokolowski, Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies, 13, 171-6 (1972)). It is during this period also that Antiochus III receives the epithet, "Magnus" during his successful expeditions in the east (Appian, Syrian Wars, 1.1).

In his newfound strength and wealth, Antiochus III returns to fight the king of Egypt, still holding both crowns, East and North. This time he utterly destroys the army of the child king Ptolemy V, under the command of Scopas at Panium, and at last takes possession of Coele-Syria (Polybius, The Histories, Book 16.18-19). The year is 200 B.C..

Daniel 11:14

"And in those times there shall many stand up against the king of the south: also the robbers of thy people shall exalt themselves to establish the vision; but they shall fall."

The angelic narrator pauses to describe the general state of affairs for the king of the south and the Jews during "those times." As noted under verse 12, Ptolemy IV's victory at Raphia, rather than solidifying his army's loyalty, instead emboldened them to seek independence from him. As Günther Hölbl, historian of the Ptolemaic Empire, describes, the period after Raphia was defined by instability, rebellion, insurrection and civil war in Egypt:

"In the years following 217, some men of the new military class led a revolt against the Ptolemaic regime in the northern part of the country. ... A papyrus dating to the end of the third century, probably sill during [Ptolemy IV's] reign, describes how Egyptian bandits attacked a military post and a temple precinct; ... From the Rosetta Stone we also know that, at the end of [Ptolemy IV's] reign, civil war raged in the Delta." (Hölbl, Günthner, A History of the Ptolemaic Empire (London and New York: Routledge (2001) 154)

Under the reign of his son, Ptolemy V, who was just a child when he took the throne, Antiochus III and Phillip of Macedon immediately set upon his dominions, "tearing to shreds the boy's kingdom" (Polybius, The Histories, Book 15.20.6). Thus did "many stand up against the king of the south" ... "in those times."

During the same period, the tax-farming, phil-hellenic Jewish Tobiads arose to prominence in Judæa under Ptolemy IV and Ptolemy V, gladly switching sides to Antiochus III after his victory at Panium (Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book 12, 154-185). The rise of these phil-hellenic Jews set the stage for a watershed conflict that would unfold between the Tobiads and the Maccabees later under Antiochus IV.

Daniel 11:15

"So the king of the north shall come, and cast up a mount, and take the most fenced cities: and the arms of the south shall not withstand, neither his chosen people, neither shall there be any strength to withstand."

Antiochus III is still king in Asia Minor within the Taurus mountains. After his victory at Panium, he quarters for winter and then proceeds to reduce Ptolemy V's fortified citadels along the southern coast of Asia Minor.

The commentaries typically relate that Antiochus III "besieged [Scopas] in Sidon together with ten thousand of his soldiers" (Jerome, Commentary on Daniel 11:15-16). However, no evidence of this siege has ever been found, except the mentions made of it in Jerome's and Porphyry's commentaries on Daniel. No Greek or Roman historian ever made note of it.

The evidence we do have for the fulfillment of the prophecy is from Livius, who describes Antiochus III's naval campaign as it is in progress against Ptolemy V's fortified citadels that dotted the southern coast of Asia Minor, south of the Taurus mountains:

“His object was … to attempt the reduction of the cities along the whole coastline of Cilicia, Lycia and Caria which owed allegiance to Ptolemy... He had so far secured Zephyrium, Soli, Aphrodisias and Corycus, and after rounding Anemurium—another Cilician headland—had captured Selinus. All these towns and other fortified places on this coast had submitted to him either voluntarily or under the stress of fear, but Coracesium unexpectedly shut its gates against him.” (Livius, History of Rome, Book 33.19-20)

Facing resistance, Antiochus III had no option but to surround and besiege Coracesium, one of Ptolemy V's most prized strongholds. Unable to defend his own fortresses, the Romans attempted to intervene and demanded that Antiochus III "restore to Ptolemy [V] all the towns that he had taken from him after the death of Ptolemy [IV]" (Polybius, The Histories, Book 18.1.14)

Loss of the Northern Crown

This concludes the section of Daniel 11 that deals with the Northern Period of the House of Seleucus. As we noted in part 1, the next verses of Daniel 11 address the defeat of Antiochus III at the Battle of Magnesia in 190 B.C., and the eviction of the Seleucid line from Asia Minor and Thrace under the terms of the Treaty of Apamea in 188 B.C.. From that point onward, the northern territory of Asia Minor and Thrace was forbidden to the Seleucids, and they were confined to the east as Kings of Syria. After Antiochus III dies, his sons rule after him in Syria, the younger of whom will "obtain the kingdom by flatteries" (Daniel 11:21) and become a significant figure through Daniel 11:39. Notably, the angel keeps talking about the Seleucids, but simply stops calling them "king of the north." That leads us to a conclusion about Daniel 11 that completely eliminates the need for the Shifting Frame introduced by Jerome at 11:5. The frame of reference appears to have remained static since verse 5.

The Shifting Frame was Unnecessary

As the historical record bears out, the Seleucids actually ruled in Asia Minor and Thrace in the early years depicted in Daniel 11, and whenever the angelic narrator foresees them as "king of the north," the prophecy is fulfilled by Seleucids who are in possession of the north. Then the Seleucids are evicted, ruling thenceforth only the east, and the angel simply stops calling them "king of the north." In other words, what was "north" in Daniel 8:8 and 11:4 remained "north" for the whole prophecy, and there was never a need to impose a Judæan Frame of Reference at all. The single Alexandrian Frame of Reference in which the chapter was apparently written was sufficient all along.

The Eschatological Implications

The implications of approaching Daniel 11 in a single frame of reference are far reaching, but we will address only one of them here. The "king of the north" is mentioned again in Daniel 11:40, and though Porphyry tried in vain to show that Antiochus IV made one last foray into Egypt, the historical record shows otherwise. The reality is that nothing about Daniel 11:40-45 even remotely resembles the career of any Seleucid kings, but the angel just kept on narrating as if foreseeing a continuous history of the Greek empire—start to finish.

Unable to find a clear fulfillment in the Seleucids at the end of the chapter, eschatologists typically resort again to a shifting frame. Some initiate a new frame of reference as early as verse 21, others as late as verse 40. The governing assumption of the new frame is that there must be yet another unannounced discontinuity in the prophecy, causing the latter part of the chapter to be centered on the location of a distant future antagonist. Jerome, for example, suggested that the prophecies after verse 24 "are spoken prophetically of the Antichrist who is to arise in the end time" (Jerome, Commentary on Daniel 11:24).

We suggest, however, that if the Shifting Frame of Reference was unnecessary earlier in the chapter, then yet another frame is also unnecessary at the end. There is a simpler solution than to keep changing the frame of reference to make the prophecy fit historical events. In any case the text (we hasten to add) only mentions one reference frame in the first place.

The solution we offer is a very simple one: if chapter 11 is a continuous narrative written in a single frame of reference (as it appears to be), and the title "king of the north" is geographic rather than dynastic (as the evidence shows), then the answer to the mystery of Daniel 11:40-45 is not to be found in Syria or in the Seleucids or even in a distant future antagonist by importing yet another frame of reference. The answer is rather to be found in Asia Minor and Thrace, to the north. We should simply look there to find out who was "king of the north." It certainly was not the Syrian Seleucids, banned forever from the northern territory by the Romans.

But somebody eventually became "king of the north"—king over Asia Minor and Thrace—years after the eviction of the Seleucids, and that somebody did exactly what he was prophesied to do, fulfilling the entirety of Daniel 11:40-45 before Rome even had her first emperor. The fulfillment has been overlooked, at least in part, because our eyes have been drawn ever eastward—thanks to Jerome and his Shifting Frame of Reference—when we should have been looking north.

We will address the remaining verses of Daniel 11 in a later series.