In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.

-          Genesis 1:1

“The work of creation is, God’s making all things of nothing, by the word of his power, in the space of six days, and all very good.” That’s the answer the Westminster Shorter Catechism gives to the question, “What is the work of creation?’ 

It’s one of my favorite question and answer sets from the Shorter Catechism, for the same reason as the passage in Genesis on which it is based is one of my favorite passages of Scripture: it captures elegantly, and in a few words, the astonishing work of the creation of all things.

In the introduction to his commentary on Genesis, John Gill wrote,  “In the Syriac and Arabic versions, the title of this book is "The Book of the Creation", because it begins with an account of the creation of all things; and is such an account, and so good an one, as is not to be met with anywhere else.”

Genesis is, as Gill implies in the quote above, not the only account of creation from the ancient world. The Greeks had a creation mythology, as did the Babylonians and numerous other cultures. 

But creation mythology is not limited to the ancient world.  In modern times, we have our own mythological creation account known as the Big Bang.  This account, just like the ones from the ancient world, is a garbled version of the true account of the creation of the heavens, the earth, and all that is in them as set forth in Genesis chapter 1.     

At this point, some may ask how it is I can prove that the Biblical account of creation is true and that the others are mythological and false.  The short answer to this question is that the creation account given in Genesis is part of the inerrant, infallible, 66 books that comprise the revealed Word of God.

If you ask me to prove that the 66 books of the Bible are the revealed Word of God, my answer is that not only can I not prove to you that the 66 books of the Bible are the inerrant and revealed Word of God, but also that it would be impious for me to even attempt to do so.    

Now before you think I’ve thrown in the intellectual towel and am simply trying to dodge a serious question about why I believe what I believe, let me explain this a bit further. 

The reason that I cannot and will not attempt to prove that “the Bible alone is the Word of God” is that this is the axiom of Christianity.  It would be both foolish and impious of me to attempt to prove the axiom of Christianity. 

Why would this be foolish?

Because trying to prove an axiom is absurd.  The reason it’s absurd lies in the definition of the term “axiom.” 

In his 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language, Noah Webster defined “axiom” as, “a principle received without new proof.”  Therefore, if one proves an axiom is true, it is no longer an axiom.

Another way of thinking about the axioms is to understand them as a first principle in a system of thought.  Christianity is a system of thought.  Platonism and Aristotelianism are systems of thought.  Darwinism is a system of thought.  All systems of thought, whether Christian or pagan, have one thing in common.  They all have a beginning point, a first principle.  As John Robbins once put it in an email to this author, all thinking must begin somewhere.  The proposition that stands first in a system of thought is called an axiom.  It is a first principle.     

This may seem like an obvious point, but one of the most important things to remember about first principles is that they are, by definition, first.  If a first principle could be proven, it would no longer be a first principle.  The proof of the original axiom would then become the new first principle.

Gordon Clark well understood the necessity of unproven and unprovable first principles, writing about them in God’s Hammer,

Christianity is often repudiated on the ground that it is circular: The Bible is authoritative because the Bible authoritatively says so.  But this objection applies no more to Christianity than to any philosophic system or even to geometry.  Every system of organized propositions depends of necessity on some indemonstrable premises, and every system must make an attempt to explain how these primary premises come to be accepted.

The axiom of Christianity is, “the Bible alone is the Word of God.”  As Christians, we begin all our thinking with this proposition.    

As Clark indicated in the quote above, this leads us to another important question for Christians, why do we accept the premise that the Bible alone is the Word of God?  There are, after all, other texts that many people believe hold divine authority.  The Koran is one such example.  There are others.  The pronouncements of modern-day scientists hold much the same authority in the minds of many people in our time.  Think about the how the climate change advocates present their case.  “The science is settled,” they frequently tell us.  If you don’t agree, you’re a “science denier,” a 21st century version of a heretic.  

If you were to ask me why I believe the account of creation as set forth in Genesis – and just to be clear, when I say that I believe the account in Genesis, I do not mean this in some qualified way, such as those who advocate theistic evolution or some other scheme that denies what the Word of God plainly teaches; I believe it in the common sense that it was understood by Christians before the age of Darwinism; that is to say, I believe that God spoke the universe into existence out of nothing, in the space of six literal twenty-four hour days, and all very good -  I could provide several subordinate reasons.

One I’ve already given above.  The account of creation found in Genesis is astonishingly well written.  It is at once simple enough for a child to grasp, yet profound in its implications such that Job was reduced to silence when the Lord questioned him, asking, “Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth?”    

A second argument I could give for believing what the Bible teaches about creation is that it fits remarkably well with the rest of the Scriptures.  Above it was mentioned that Christianity is a system of thought.  This is an important point in the thought of both Gordon Clark and John Robbins.  Christianity is not, as some seem to think in our own time, a grab bag of ideas all thrown together in a heap.  Christianity is a logical system of thought.

Because Christianity is a system of thought, denying the account of creation as set forth in Genesis necessarily calls into question other Biblical doctrines which depend on a proper understanding of Genesis. For example, if we disbelieve Genesis, we call into question God’s character.  In essence, we’re calling him a liar and saying to him that he really didn’t do the things he said he did.  And if God lied to us about his work of creation, why would we trust him in other matters?     

When we say that the various parts of the Bible fit together into a nicely consistent whole, and that this is proof that it is the Word of God, we’re using what is called the coherence theory of truth.  That is to say, a system of thought is true because its various parts fit together much as a jigsaw puzzle does.  The Westminster Confession calls this the “consent of all the parts” in Chapter 1.VI. 

The two reasons I’ve laid out here for why I believe the 66 books of the Bible, including Genesis chapter 1, are true are, I think, good reasons.  But they are not in themselves conclusive. 

Indeed, the Roman Catholic Church-State did not find such arguments conclusive at the time of the Reformation, nor does it now.  According to Gordon Clark,

At the time of the Reformation when Luther and Calvin appealed to the Scriptures, the Roman Church argued that it and it alone accredited the Scriptures, and that therefore the Protestants could not legitimately use the Scriptures without first submitting to Rome.  People were supposed to accept God’s Word only on the authority of the church (God’s Hammer, 16). 

But if the majesty of the style of Scripture – for example the remarkable literary skill already mentioned that one finds in Genesis – or the way the doctrines of the Bible fit together so well despite the many authors, circumstances and even languages in which it was written are not conclusive reason for believing the Bible is the Word of God.  What is? 

Clark answers,

Against this claim [that the Church-State’s authority was needed to authenticate the Scriptures] the reformers developed the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit. The belief that the Bible is the Word of God, so they taught, is neither the result of a papal pronouncement nor a conclusion inferred from prior premises; it is a belief which the holy Spirit himself produces in our minds (16).

Or as the Westminster Confession puts it,

Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth [of Scripture] and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.

That is to say, saving faith, which consists of both understanding and consenting to the doctrines of Scripture, is a gift of God, is produced by of the God the Holy Spirit regenerating our hearts. 

Why do Christians accept what the Bible teaches about creation in Genesis 1 and reject the accounts of the ancient creation myths, the secular philosophers, and the modern Darwinists?  Because God the Holy Spirit has caused them to believe the Bible and to reject other truth claims. 

“But we will certainly do whatever has gone out of our own mouth, to burn incense to the queen of heaven and pour out drink offerings to her, as we have done, we and our fathers, our kings and our princes, in the cities of Judah and in the streets of Jerusalem.  For then we had plenty of food, were well-off, and saw no trouble.”

-          Jeremiah 44:17

In his book Logic, Gordon Clark noted a number of informal logical fallacies.  On page 17, he mentioned, among others, a fallacy called in Latin post hoc ergo propter hoc, or as we would say it in English, “after this, therefore because of this.” This logical error, hereafter the post hoc fallacy, involves asserting that, because event B took place after event A, that A is what caused B. 

Now it’s true that there can be a cause and effect relationship between an earlier event and a late event.  In Jeremiah 44, the prophet, speaking for God, states, “You have seen all the calamity that I have brought on Jerusalem…because of their wickedness which they have committed to provoke Me to anger.”  God makes it entirely clear in this passage that the prior disobedience of the people of Judah was the cause of his bringing judgment on Jerusalem.  We don’t have to guess at why the Babylonians leveled Jerusalem and burned the temple in 586 BC, God tells us explicitly both the cause and the effect. 

Later in chapter 44, we get the reaction from the people to whom Jeremiah was prophesying.  As it turned out, they didn’t much care for his sermon. Part of their response to Jeremiah was a classic case of post hoc fallacy.  See if you can spot it.

But we will certainly do whatever has gone out of our own mouth, to burn incense to the queen of heaven and pour out drink offerings to her, as we have done, we and our fathers, our kings and our princes, in the cities of Judah and in the streets of Jerusalem.  For then we had plenty of food, were well-off, and saw no trouble. But since we stopped burning incense to the queen of heaven and pouring out drink offering to her, we have lacked everything and have been consumed by the sword and by famine (Jeremiah 44:17-18).

Did I say, see if you can spot it?  Reading this passage further, it seems to me that there are two post hoc fallacies to be found.  In the first place, the people argue that their burning incense and pouring out drink offerings were the cause of their prosperity when they were in the land, when, in fact, it was God’s grace that provided for them.  Second, they attributed their current state of exile to their worshipping the queen of heaven, when, in fact, the cause of their exile was God’s punishing them for their disobedience.  

I bring up the preceding Biblical example of post hoc fallacy to introduce the main point of this post, which is to refute the linkage, put forward by mainstream financial reporters, the outbreak of the Corona virus in China is reason for the recent stock market sell off and spike in the price of gold. 

Stocks Down, Gold Up – Obviously, It’s Coronavirus!

A quick look at two headlines from Friday on CNBC will give you a good sense of just how hard the mainstream financial media is pushing the coronavirus-as-end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it meme.

In the first place, CNBC wants you to believe that Friday’s, and the week’s, stock selloff was due to coronavirus.  “Dow drops more than 200 points, posts losing week as coronavirus fears resurface,” was how they put it.  Similar headlines could be found earlier in the week as well.  Now some may argue, “the headline doesn’t explicitly say, “Coronavirus causes 200-point drop in the stock market. It merely says that stocks went down as coronavirus fears went up.”  Technically, that’s true.  CNBC doesn’t make an explicit causal link between coronavirus and stocks going down.  But the intent, in my opinion, of headlines of this sort is to plant the seed in the reader’s mind that there is a cause and effect relationship at work.  Just read through the article to see what I mean.

On the same day as the headline above, CNBC ran another headline, this one reading, “Gold surges 1.5% on growing coronavirus concerns.”  Not only does coronavirus have the ability to drive down stocks, but it can cause gold to spike as well. 

In both cases, sinking stock and rising gold, CNBC is asking its readers to accept coronavirus as the cause.    First came coronavirus, then stocks went down and gold went up.  Post hoc, ergo propter hoc.

Now, am I saying that coronavirus could have no effect on stocks or gold?  After all, it appears that the illness has caused significant economic disruption in the world’s second largest economy.  Could not such a disruption cause stocks to go down and at the same time cause gold – gold is considered a “risk off” asset, one that does well when “risk on” assets such as stocks are doing poorly – to go up? Yes, it could.   

But while coronavirus could cause stocks to go down and gold to go up, it is not, in my view, the primary reason for these events.

To illustrate what I mean, consider that case of an overly indebted man who has a personal financial crisis due to an unexpected car repair bill.  The man has been living beyond his means for years, but has successfully shuffled his debts around, staying just one step ahead of bankruptcy.  Now ask yourself, was the unexpected car repair the reason this fellow suddenly found himself in financial dire straits, or was it the years of profligate living?  I would argue that it was the years of profligacy that were the real cause.  The unexpected car repair bill was just the thing the happened to expose the underlying problem, one that had been building for a long time before his car suddenly had mechanical problems.

In like fashion, the West’s financial system has been deteriorating for years, while at the same time stocks are hitting record highs and safety assets such as gold and silver are, comparatively speaking, performing very poorly.  In the opinion of this author, this is an artificial situation.  Stocks, in fact, should be much lower, while gold and silver should be much higher.  A better explanation for the current stock market troubles and breakout in the gold price is required. 

 It’s the Fed! It’s the Fed! It’s the Fed!

I mentioned above that the current valuation of the stock market is artificial, that is to say, it is not based on market forces.  Stocks aren’t the only asset in a bubble, either.  At the same time, we have a stock market bubble, we also have a bond market bubble and a housing bubble.  There are so many assets in bubble territory – by bubble, I simply mean the assets in question are overvalued - that some financial observers are calling it the “everything bubble.” 

In the late 90’s we had the tech bubble.  Any stocks with .com in their name immediately shot up to stratospheric valuations, only to come crashing down in 2000.  In the 00’s, we had the housing bubble, when real estate zoomed up in value, only to tank in 2008 during the financial crisis.  In fact, the 2008 crisis was closely related to the popping of the housing bubble.     Now we have the everything bubble, with stocks, bonds and real estate all at record valuations. 

So how is it possible to have so many markets in bubble territory?  The root cause of the everything bubble is the same as that of the .com and housing bubbles – it’s the Fed. 

Ever since the 2008 crises, the Fed, together with the Plunge Protection Team (PPT) and the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), has used its enormous power and influence, not only to prop up favored markets, but to suppress those out of favor.  It has done this through money printing – quantitative easing, or QE – market manipulation – some of the Fed’s manipulations are overt, such as cutting interest rates, while some of them are covert and speculative; for example, a recent headline in ZeroHedge reported that then Fed Chairman Janet Yellen said in 2017 that the Fed “might be able to help the U.S. economy in a future downturn if it could buy stocks and corporate bonds”; what are the odds this is already going on in secret? -  and good old fashioned propaganda. 

So what’s the problem with market rigging?  There are several, one of the most pernicious of which is this:  Once you start rigging, you can’t stop.  Market rigging, you see, is a lot like telling a lie.  Just as you can’t tell only one lie, so too you can’t just rig one market.  Rather, you have to rig all markets. 

If you want to create the (false) perception that the economy is doing great, you have to push up stocks and housing.  The most effective way to push up stocks and housing is to artificially support the bond market.  The Fed, by purchasing bonds through QE, artificially raises the price of bonds, which has the effect of artificially lowering bond yields.  When bond yields are held down, this pushes cash into the stock market where it can find a better return than it can in the bond market.  Lowering bond yields also lowers the interest rate of home loans, making it easier for people to borrow more money to buy a house.  More money flowing into the housing market means higher housing prices. 

At the bottom of all this is Fed money printing.  If the Fed did not have the ability to create money out of nothing and then to use that newly created (counterfeited) money to purchase US Treasuries (and quite possibly other assets), stocks, bonds and real estate would all be much lower.

But as was mentioned above, once the Fed started on its program of market manipulation – the Fed’s market manipulation began in earnest with the 2008 crisis, but it had been going on for at least 20 years before that – it found it could not stop. 

Market rigging, you see, is a bit like having the proverbial tiger by the tail - Once you grab it, you can’t let go or you get eaten.  Likewise, once the Fed started rigging markets, it found it couldn’t stop.    

This is not for lack of trying.  Beginning in December 2015, the Fed started to inch up interest rates up from 0%.  This program went on through December 2018, at which point the markets crashed.  This prompted Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin to convene an emergency meeting of the PPT  on December 24, 2018.  Remarkably, when markets reopened the day after Christmas, the Dow shot up a record 1,100 points.  But if you think this was the PPT’s doing, you’re a conspiracy theorist. 

Almost immediately after the December 2018 market crash, Fed Chairman Jay Powell announced the reversal of the Fed’s policy of raising interest rates as well as an end to its Quantitative Tightening (QT) program of selling long dated US Treasuries.

Today the Fed once again is in full QE mode and, very likely, will be lowering interest rates in March.

As Proverbs tells us, “Treasures of wickedness profit nothing,” and, “Wealth gained by dishonesty will be diminished.”  In like fashion, while all the Fed’s machinations so far have been successful at propping up stocks and housing, these artificially inflated markets are very unstable and susceptible to crashing.  All it takes is for some unexpected event, a virus outbreak for example, to undo them. 

It’s not the cornovirus that’s the cause of our current bout of financial instability, it’s the Fed.

 Gold and Silver Suppressed

As mentioned above there are any number of financial assets that are now in bubble territory.  But two that decidedly are not are gold and especially silver. This is not an accident.  Just as the powers-that-shouldn’t be artificially inflate the value of favored assets, so too do they suppress the value of assets they don’t like, precious metals.  Gregory Mannarino, a trader and YouTuber whose work I follow, refers to these monetary metals as being in an “inverse bubble.”  That is to say, he believes their value is being artificially held down, and by the same people who seek to artificially inflate stocks, bonds and real estate. 

But just as artificially inflated bubbles in stocks, bonds and real estate are unstable, so too are inverse bubbles in gold and silver. 

Rather than seeing gold going up due to coronavirus, a more likely explanation is that the rise in gold is due to Fed money printing.  Gold started a major bull run as priced in US dollars around the end of May 2019, long before anyone had even heard of coronavirus.  Not only was this in response to the Fed’s actions to that point, but many observers think the smart money anticipated the Fed’s bailout of the banks via its program of supporting the Repo Market, which began in September and  is still ongoing.  

So Why Are They Pushing the Coronavirus Meme? 

If it’s true what I’ve said, that the problems in the stock market and the rise in gold are due, not to the coronavirus, but to the activities of the Fed, why is the media pushing the coronavirus meme? 

The answer:  The mainstream media’s main job is not to inform you, but to misinform you.

You see, fellow deplorables, we’re not supposed to know the secrets of the high priests at the Fed.  They are our betters.  They are our masters.  Our job, like ordinary Roman Catholics before the Reformation, is to accept what our masters at the Fed and in the media say, with implicit faith.  That is to say, our job is to take what they tell us at face value and never, ever ask uncomfortable questions. 

The masters of the universe have an unspoken rule: Whenever there’s an economic problem, a fall guy is needed.  The Fed must never be blamed.

Back in the 70’s there was a terrible bout of inflation that was the result of President Nixon pulling the plug on the Bretton Woods accord in 1971.  Even as a young boy, I remember hearing all the excuses for rising prices.  It was the oil sheiks of OPEC.  It was frost in the orange groves in Florida.  It was droughts, hurricanes and hailstorms. 

Anything but the truth, Fed money printing.

Think about that famous scene in the Wizard of Oz, where Toto goes and pulls back the curtain hiding the “Wizard” in his control booth.  “Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain,” bellows the Wizard, trying desperately to keep Dorothy and friends from discovering that the Wizards was no Wizard at all, but just a man with a lot of special effects at hand.

That’s exactly the way we’re treated. 

And it doesn’t matter what your political persuasion is, either.

You could be the bluest of blue Bernie Bros who hangs on every word Rachel Maddow speaks.  Watch her program for years if you will.  Listen to all of Bernie’s stump speeches several times over.  You’ll hear them talk about income and wealth inequality, but you’ll never once hear them pin it on the real culprit, the Fed.

You could be the reddest of red staters, owning multiple MAGA hats and never missing a minute of Sean Hannity.  Yet you’ll never once hear him talk about the role the Fed plays in creating price inflation and how its policies have caused stagnant wages and reduced living standards for the very people Donald Trump claims to represent, ordinary working Americans.    

Even if you’re a middle of the roader and stick to mainstream network news, it’s the same sorry state of affairs.  Watch the evening news for decades on end if you will, but you’ll never learn a thing about how the Fed creates money from nothing and hands it out to its friends and how you pay for it.

These omissions are not by accident.  They are by design. 

The powers that shouldn’t be are quite happy that people are ignorant of the games the Fed plays and they want to make sure people stay that way.

Flooding the airwaves with false explanations of financial market activity is how they keep people in the dark. 

It’s not the coronavirus.  It’s the money printing.

It’s the Fed.     

It’s the Fed.

It’s the Fed.

There was a time when people understood that knowingly holding to contradictory beliefs was immoral. Philosophers and theologians alike strove to present logically consistent systems of thought devoid of any contradictions between their constitutive propositions. With postmodernism’s essentialist declarations concerning anthropology, language, morality, and epistemology, however, contradiction has come to be viewed, ironically enough, as an essential part of human intellection. Systems of thought that purport to be contradiction-free, consequently, are judged to be either hopelessly philosophically naive or arrogant and dishonest. And this, of course, includes religious systems of thought.

Accordingly, the contemporary non-religious world views Christianity as naive and/or dishonest because it asserts that it and it alone is true. Within many professedly Christian churches, the same sentiment is directed against those who assert that certain doctrines are foundationally true, such that a denial of these doctrines indicates that one is lost. Whereas the world demands that Christians abandon our uniqueness and let religious bygones be bygones, many in professedly Christian churches demand that we abandon orthodoxy and let doctrinal bygones be bygones.

In both instances, what is being embraced is the postmodern idea that contradiction is inevitable, even in the pages of God’s Word. Additionally, what is implicitly embraced is the conviction that contradictions, in fact, are good, seeing as they push forward a progressively unfolding and expanding theological dialectic which will never resolve in this life. This open-ended dialectic is seen as the means whereby Christians may be epistemically humbled and led to soften their tone regarding the core doctrines of Christianity.

But Scripture doesn’t support this view of contradictions. In fact, Scriprture consistently teaches that contradictions are evil, wicked. For instance, consider what Paul says in 2nd Cor 1:17 –

Was I vacillating when I wanted to do this? Do I make my plans according to the flesh, ready to say “Yes, yes” and “No, no” at the same time?

In this passage, Paul explains that saying yes and no at the same time, and in the same sense, is not morally neutral, it is according to the flesh, or carnal. It is to be, in essence, what James calls “double-minded” in James 1:5-8. He writes –

If any of you lacks wisdom, let him ask God, who gives generously to all without reproach, and it will be given him. But let him ask in faith, with no doubting, for the one who doubts is like a wave of the sea that is driven and tossed by the wind. For that person must not suppose that he will receive anything from the Lord; he is a double-minded man, unstable in all his ways.

Such self-contradictory thinking renders us unstable, unable to think and act in accordance with the truth. Self-contradiction is part and parcel of what is not knowledge at all. In 1st Tim 6:20 Paul writes –

O Timothy, guard the deposit entrusted to you. Avoid the irreverent babble and contradictions of what is falsely called “knowledge…”

Contradictions, then, are neither profound, enlightening, good, spiritual, or godly. Rather, contradictions are carnal.

WHO CARES?

Some may ask why it is important to point out that contradictions are carnal. There are many reasons we can give, but the following three are among the greatest.

1. False teachers are bitterly opposed to clear thinking. If a teacher trades in contradictory statements regarding his doctrine or his personal life (e.g. whether he is or is not involved in a given sinful relationship or behavior), then we may properly identify him as, at the very least, a threat to the stability of the church. At worst, he is an enemy of God and his church who must be publicly rebuked, renounced, and removed from the pulpit. In either case, he is unfit for the ministry of the Word and should be avoided.

2. Understanding that contradictions are to be eliminated from our thinking will cause us to be more cautious in our doctrine and in our life. The goal of being without any contradictions in our thinking should lead us to strive toward that end, knowing that being consistent in our thinking is not an empty academic exercise but an exercise in godliness.

3. Contradictions are false, and we are to be people of the Truth, who believe the truth, and who are led by the Spirit of Truth to walk in the way of truth.

In regeneration, we are given the mind of Christ. Let us be conformed by his Word to think as he does – without contradictions.

§ I. Introduction: There Are No Atheists

For centuries, many apologists have presented arguments in defense of the existence of God to men who self-identify as atheists. Yet the Scriptures are clear on this matter –

...what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse. For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were darkened.1

In addition to having had the sin and guilt of Adam imputed to himself, fallen man also incurs the wrath of God because he knows God is the Creator, Law-Giver, and Judge of all men, and yet refuses to honor God as God or give him thanks. Paul’s words here are universal and, therefore, exclude no person who ever has lived, is now living, or will ever live subsequent to the Fall.

There is no question about the matter – God reveals to us that there are no atheists. Instead, there are idolaters who have “exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds and animals and reptiles.”2 Rather than trusting the Word of God, the professed atheist trusts in his own word. Rather than obeying God’s moral law, the professed atheist establishes his own rule of conduct. Rather than working within the metaphysical framework revealed by God to man in his Word, the atheist constructs his own metaphysical framework in which he seeks to operate free from the ontological and providential strictures placed upon him by God.

Psalms 14 and 53 are often cited as proof that the Scriptures recognize some men who are actually atheists, but these psalms do no such thing. Their shared opening line – “The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God’” – is a concise way of expressing the attitude of the unbeliever who thinks that the one true God will not bring his (i.e. the atheist’s) thoughts, words, and deeds into judgment. As Willem A. VanGemeren explains –

The word “fool” is synonymous with “wicked”...It reflects the wisdom tradition where the “fool” aggressively and intentionally flouts independence from God and his commandments...

[…]

The denial of God is not an absolute denial of his existence. The pagans around Israel believed in many gods, and the impious in Israel did not rationalistically deny the historic and cultural links between the Lord and Israel. In their impudence fools disregard God’s expectations. God is not important in their lives. They shut off the affairs of this world from divine intervention and deny any personal accountability to God for their actions.3

No man is truly an atheist; rather, all men know God by means of direct revelation to them. What can be known of him has been made known to them by God. However, fallen men pervert the truth about him, ascribe divine attributes to his creation, and show themselves to be idolaters by worshiping a divinized creation.

§ II. What is an Atheist?

Hence, the atheist is an idolater who replaces the Creator with the creature, imbuing the creation with divine attributes in one way or another. For instance, the materialist believes that matter is everywhere (i.e. omnipresent), the source of all potential and actual power (i.e. omnipotent), and the source of all knowledge and consciousness (i.e. omniscient). Matter is literally the alpha and the omega of all things. It is a se, seeing as it is not dependent on anything for its existence, but instead is the source of all that exists. Even the atheist’s moral code is dictated to him by the creation indirectly (as in the case of deriving one’s sense of right and wrong from observing animal social conduct) or directly (as in the case of issuing commands to others and oneself upon the basis of one’s perceived autonomous authority).

Atheism differs from other forms of idolatry, however, because its “unknown God” is neither a crude mythological deity whose attributes and actions are exaggerated human attributes and actions, nor is its “unknown God” personal and, therefore, an imitation of Yahweh. The “unknown God” of the atheists is an abstraction from both of these theological sources. For, on the one hand, the atheist believes that everything is ultimately physical; while, on the other hand, the atheist believes that the physical alpha and omega is elemental and knowable by means of abstraction. It is not this or that physical object perceptible to the senses that is the atheist’s god, it is the immanent physical ground of all derivative physical beings.

This is not, of course, how atheists would self-identify. Rather, contemporary atheists at the popular level define their position as “a lack of belief in gods.”4 Note that this definition does not speak to the objective state of affairs that obtains (i.e. whether or not God exists), as it is a description of an individual’s psychological state. Whereas “older dictionaries define[d] atheism as ‘a belief that there is no God,’”5 contemporary atheists will often argue that these older definitions are due to “theistic influences,”6 and that “without the (mono)theistic influence, the definition would at least read ‘there are no gods.’”7 However, this is not the case, as philosopher Paul Draper explains –

“Atheism” is typically defined in terms of “theism”. Theism, in turn, is best understood as a proposition—something that is either true or false. It is often defined as “the belief that God exists”, but here “belief” means “something believed”. It refers to the propositional content of belief, not to the attitude or psychological state of believing. This is why it makes sense to say that theism is true or false and to argue for or against theism. If, however, “atheism” is defined in terms of theism and theism is the proposition that God exists and not the psychological condition of believing that there is a God, then it follows that atheism is not the absence of the psychological condition of believing that God exists (more on this below). The “a-” in “atheism” must be understood as negation instead of absence, as “not” instead of “without”. Therefore, in philosophy at least, atheism should be construed as the proposition that God does not exist (or, more broadly, the proposition that there are no gods).

This definition has the added virtue of making atheism a direct answer to one of the most important metaphysical questions in philosophy of religion, namely, “Is there a God?” There are only two possible direct answers to this question: “yes”, which is theism, and “no”, which is atheism.8

From this it follows that it is not incorrect to define atheism as the belief that God does not exist or, what is essentially the same thing, to define an atheist as one who assents to the proposition that God does not exist.

§ III. The Logical Problem

Thus far we have taken for granted that the assertion “God exists” is one that may be meaningfully denied. However, is this the case? What does it mean to affirm that God exists? Logically speaking the word “is” functions as the copula connecting the subject term of a proposition to its attendant predicate term, as the following diagram demonstrates –

The assertion “God exists,” then, expresses either one of the following propositions –

1. A particular logical subject of predication [viz. God] has the property of being a logical subject of predication.
2. A particular logical subject of predication [viz. God] has the property of x [i.e. an undefined property signified by the word exists].

Whereas proposition 2. may be translated into a non-tautologous proposition (e.g. “God exists” = “God is an extra-conceptual being with all of the attributes classically and biblically ascribed to him”), proposition 1. is a tautology that is true of any given logical subject of predication. More concisely, if the assertion “God exists” is not idiomatic shorthand for a lengthier proposition in which attributes are predicated of God (e.g. “God is a non-fictional/extraconceptual being”), then it is akin to asserting x is x. This being the case, it follows that unless the atheist defines his terminology, explaining what he means when he says “God does not exist,” his assertion is at best ambiguous. And at worst, it is self-contradictory, for the assertion “God does not exist” would then be logically identical to the proposition “This logical subject of predication [viz. God] has the property of not being a logical subject of predication [i.e. “not existing”].” This is not a return to Anselm’s Ontological Argument, but a simple recognition of a logical problem facing the atheist. If “being” cannot be divorced from “being the logical subject of predication,” and it cannot, then one cannot rationally deny the “existence” of any logical subject once it has been verbally, or by some other means of communication, identified as a logical subject.

§ IV. Who or What are Rightly Called Atheists?

Before examining the meaning of the assertion “God does not exist,” we must first do away with the popular level definition of atheism as a lack of belief in gods by subjecting it to scrutiny. Below we will look at some, but not all, of the problems that the popular definition of atheism entails.

1. The Problem of Non-conscious Beings

If atheism is a lack of beliefs in gods, then any thing (being) lacking consciousness is, therefore, an atheist. Observe –

1. Non-conscious beings lack every kind of belief.
2. Belief in gods is a kind of belief.
3. Therefore, non-conscious beings lack belief in gods.

Applying the law of transitivity, we have the following –

1. If beings that lack belief in gods are atheists,
2. and non-conscious beings lack belief in gods,
3. then non-conscious beings are atheists.

This is not what the atheist intends to communicate, but it is what follows from his definition of atheism as a lack of belief in gods. In order to avoid this, the atheist must clarify what he means when defines atheism as a lack of belief in gods.

2. The Problem of Unconscious Beings

The atheist will, perhaps, clarify what he means by stating that atheism is a lack of belief in gods found among personal beings with the capacity for consciousness, but this is only a little bit better. Consider –

1. Atheism is a lack of belief in gods found among consciousness-capable beings.
2. Consciousness-capable beings are categorizable as either conscious or unconscious.
3. Therefore, atheism is a lack of belief in gods found among conscious or unconscious consciousness-capable beings.

What is more, assuming for the sake of argument that it is possible for a person to become absolutely unconscious in the cases of sleep, medically induced comas, accidentally induced comas, and so on (an assumption to which it seems atheists would generally not object), the popular definition of atheism inexorably results in the absurdity of affirming that unconscious theists become atheists by means of their being rendered unconscious. Thus, in the case of sleeping theists it would be valid to argue the following –

1. Those who are unconscious lack all kinds of beliefs.
2. Sleeping theists are part of those who are unconscious.
3. Therefore, sleeping theists lack all kinds of beliefs.
4. If one lacks all kinds of beliefs, then one lacks a belief in gods.
5. Sleeping theists lack all kinds of beliefs.
6. Therefore, sleeping theists lack belief in gods.
7. All consciousness-capable being who lack belief in gods are atheists.
8. Sleeping theists are consciousness-capable beings who lack belief in gods.
9. Therefore, sleeping theists are atheists.

This is an absurd conclusion, but one that follows from the definition of atheism as a lack of belief in gods.

3. The Problem of Conscious Beings

What we have examined above is not a straw man of what the atheist believes, but is an examination of the logical conclusions we may derive from the atheist’s definition of atheism. We have done this in order to demonstrate that the definition given by the atheist is deficient because it would apply to a broader category of beings than that category to which the atheist intends to apply it, effectively resulting in identifying all beings as atheists. And even when qualified, the definition fails because it is still too broad, including even theists as atheists.

The atheist may attempt to further qualify his definition by stating that he is only referring to conscious consciousness-capable beings who lack belief in gods. This is better, but it is still problematic. For the sake of argument, we may grant that there exists a person whose mind is completely devoid of any ideas about God. Now let us say that this individual lives 37 years of his life without ever thinking about God, gods, cultures and individuals besides himself having or lacking belief in gods, or even his own lack of belief in gods. He is conscious of every other fact of the world capable of being known by him, as well as of his own mental life. He lacks consciousness of mainly one thing, viz. his lack of belief in gods. Suppose that this remains the case until he one day is presented with the Gospel of Christ and reflects on his mental activity, concluding that he lacks, and has always lacked, a belief in gods. Has he always been an atheist? Or has he just become an atheist? If he has always been an atheist, then it follows that those who are in an analogous situation, epistemologically speaking, are likewise atheists. This would include individuals who are cognitively undeveloped (e.g. unborn children), cognitively underdeveloped (e.g. mentally challenged persons), or who have become cognitively impaired by natural or accidental means over time (e.g. individuals with degenerative brain disease, or individuals who have experienced brain trauma).

The problem here should be evident to the attentive reader. In a word, it is this –

If a conscious individual lacks consciousness of his current lack of belief in gods, then he is no different than a person who lacks the cognitive ability to become aware of his lack of belief in gods. Consequently, there is a difference between those whose reasoning has led them to lack a belief in gods, or whose reasoning has confirmed their lack of a belief in gods as true, and those who lack the cognitive ability to rationally evaluate the arguments of theists, reject them as fallacious or unsound, and thereupon come to lack a belief in gods, etc.

To put the matter succinctly: It is simply not the case that atheism is a lack of belief in gods, for there is a clear difference between the conscious consciousness-capable individual who lacks a belief in gods due to some cognitive impairment and the individual who lacks a belief in gods as a consequence of the use of his normally functioning cognitive faculties.

4. The Problem(s) Facing the Atheist

Thus, in attempting to work around having to make a positive assertion about God’s existence the atheist has cast a wide enough net to include nearly anyone and anything that absolutely lacks consciousness for the entirety of its life (e.g. persons) or the entirety of its endurance9 (e.g. physical objects), as well as persons who lack consciousness either temporarily or for the entirety of their lives. He has, moreover, moved from asserting something objective about God or gods (e.g. There are no gods) to asserting something subjective about himself (viz. “I lack a belief in gods”). The former has monumental implications for all of human history and society, while the latter is merely a report about the psychology of one individual who does not desire to state what he does believe. As we have shown above, the atheist is not one who merely lacks a belief in gods, but one who has received, evaluated, and rejected information about gods and has, by rational means, rejected those arguments as fallacious or unsound.

Once this is reckoned with, it must further be acknowledged that disbelief in a given proposition (e.g. God exists) is necessarily dependent upon a prior commitment to an unstated epistemology which axiomatically defines what is or is not proper evidence regarding the truth of a given proposition, and scrutinizes theistic arguments on that basis. Stated more broadly,

P is dubious iff it meets some prior condition of dubiousness. The prior condition of dubiousness, moreover, is either heuristic or indubitable. If heuristic, then P is heuristically or theoretically, but not actually, dubious. However, if indubitable then P is actually dubious. Given that the skeptic believes P to be actually dubious, then it follows that he likewise believes his prior condition of dubiousness to be indubitable.

What this means is that the atheist’s disbelief is the necessary consequence of his prior commitment to certain unstated positive beliefs. His disbelief is actively reached by means of his use of reason, it is not merely a lack of belief in gods. Rather, the atheist’s lack of belief in gods is the consequence of his rational criticism of theistic arguments, rational criticism which is dependent upon his prior positive and indubitable beliefs. The atheist believes that gods do not exist.

Additionally, the atheist faces the problem that all empirico-inductivists face – the problem of hasty generalization. Given the problem of induction, it follows that the atheist cannot appeal to his examination of his mental states to demonstrate that he lacks belief in gods. The parameters in which he is to perform such an induction remaining undefined and fluid, moreover, he cannot say he is either more or less certain that he is one who lacks belief in gods. This means that the atheist may speculate that he is one who lacks belief in gods, but he does not know this to be true, nor can he know it to be true. Rather, he has assumed as indubitable inductive parameters which may heuristically “prove” that he is one who lacks belief in gods. If he truly does lack belief in gods, this cannot be known to him by means of his own empirico-inductive reasoning.

§ V. Disambiguating “Existence”

Having demonstrated that the popular definition of atheism as a lack of belief in gods is untenable, we may now return to the question of existence. As we mentioned earlier on, assertions like “x exists” are either tautologous or non-tautologous. If they are tautologous, they are asserting nothing more than the proposition “This logical subject of predication is this logical subject of predication” or “x is x.” If they are non-tautologous, they are signifying some undefined property by the word exists. Assuming that the atheist intends to communicate something non-contradictory when he denies the existence of God, we must seek to understand what he means by the term exists.

As we begin, let us note that if by saying “There is no God” the atheist means “God cannot be empirically verified” or “There is no empirical being to which the term God properly applies” then he is confusing categories. As the London Baptist Confession of 1689, following the teaching of Scripture, states –

The Lord our God is…a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions.

The lack of empirical evidence for a being who is immaterial does not demonstrate that there is no such immaterial being. Some atheists will retort that immateriality is problematic, for it seems to allow us to affirm that there are other immaterial beings in addition to God. This, however, is neither a logical nor an ontological problem. It is a problem for the materialist who believes that “existence” is synonymous with an empirically verifiable material instantiation of a given entity. However, arguing against the idea that there is a God on such a basis is an exercise in circular reasoning.

What does the atheist mean by the proposition “There is no God”? Given that he cannot say that a lack of empirical evidence regarding a non-empirical being is proof that there is no such being, we can only conclude that his proposition means “There is no non-fictional being to which the term God properly applies.” More to the point, the atheist’s belief is that God is not real. Unlike the unclear assertion that “God does not exist,” the proposition “God is not real” asserts that a particular logical subject [viz. God] is merely conceptual [i.e. is not real].” And while this is much clearer, it still suffers from a host of problems which we will now examine.

1. The Problem of Objectivity

The atheist’s belief that God is “not real” (i.e. does not “exist”) presupposes that there is a reality which he and theists can and do know. And given that he assumes he and theists know this reality, he is further assuming that reality is objective, i.e. that its constituent objects and attributes are what they are independently of his or the theist’s subjective apprehension of them. What is real, then, is that which corresponds to the collection of objects and attributes that are what they are independently of our subjective apprehension of them. For the atheist, God does not correspond to the collection of objects and attributes that are what they are independently of our subjective apprehension of them. Therefore, the atheist believes that God is not real.

This reasoning is self-contradictory, for the act of scrutinizing any given entity is necessarily subjective. To put the matter clearly – One can only scrutinize a given entity by means of subjective apprehension. If one can only affirm as objectively real that which is what it is apart from one’s subjective apprehension of it, then one cannot affirm anything as real. This necessarily implies that the atheist cannot even affirm that there is an objective reality, for how could he verify that there is a collection of objects and attributes that are what they are apart from his subjective apprehension of them if he can only subjectively apprehend them?

The common reply to this is that the atheist can affirm certain entities as real by appealing to the testimony of others. However, this merely moves the problem backward by a step. For the atheist would still need to subjectively apprehend the testimony of others. He would not be obtaining knowledge about anything objective, therefore, by subjectively apprehending the testimony of others. And this introduces another problem.

2. The Problem of Other Minds

The problem of objectivity, as we have noted already, is not solved by appealing to the testimony of others. What’s more, appealing to the testimony of others presupposes that others have minds, and this is something that cannot be verified empirically either. One may attempt to sidestep this problem by asserting that the actions of other individuals necessarily signify that those individuals, like oneself, have a mind. But upon what basis? While some of the atheist’s physical activities may signify his correlative mental activities, this says nothing about the physical activities of others. How can the atheist know that the physical activities of others signify correlative mental activities? Upon what basis does the atheist believe that his own physical activities signify to others that he has a mind simultaneously performing correlative mental activities?

Given the problem of objectivity, he has no basis for believing that his actions signify to others at all. He believes that he knows his bodily activities correlate to his mental activities. And we may grant him that, for the sake of argument. But to extend this reality to others steps beyond what he claims to have empirical evidence for, namely the body-as-mind-signifier theory that undergirds his belief that one can observe the actions of another individual and soundly infer therefrom that that individual has a mind.

3. Other Problems of Induction

As atheism rejects the reality of an all knowing mind who is capable of revealing, and who has revealed, universal truths to men, it follows that universal affirmative and negative propositions are only approximately universal. Consequently, an atheist’s deductions from assumed universal propositions are always only approximately universal. Moreover, these approximations to universality are determined by the atheist himself who, by rejecting divine revelation, must determine the parameters of his inductions. These parameters, however, must also be determined by the atheist, leading to an infinite regress of such determinations, resulting with the atheist’s inability to justifiably assert any universal proposition to be or not be the case. The atheist, therefore, cannot claim to deductively prove any proposition he holds as true. Rather, his deductions are hypotheses given the inductive parameters he has arbitrarily established. The atheist is limited to inductive reasoning, in other words, which is even more of a problem for the following reasons.

a. Inductive Reasoning Implies Knowledge of at Least One Universal – This universal is what we may call the axiom of induction. It is the necessary presupposition that property sharing entities constitute a class. This axiom lies at the foundation of all induction, but it cannot be established by induction without the atheist already employing it. The axiom is a true proposition, and this is a problem for the atheist. For to whom does the truth belong? Whose mind is the source of this proposition? It cannot be the atheist, for the atheist is limited in what he knows, as well as in how he can possibly come to know what he knows, and the axiom of induction is a true universal proposition that cannot be established by means of induction.

b. Induction is Secondary to Deduction from the Axiom of Induction – Given that induction presupposes the axiom of induction, it follows that every induction proceeds upon the basis of a prior necessary deduction from the axiom of induction. The set of particulars from which the atheist desires to draw conclusions is generated by a deduction from the axiom of induction, namely –

All property sharing entities constitute a set.
A, B, C...n+1 are property sharing entities
Therefore, A, B, C...n+1 constitute a set.

The deduction of a set from the axiom of induction, therefore, precedes all induction. This elementary observation has profound implications, for it necessarily implies that the laws of inference precede induction and cannot be justified by an appeal to inductive arguments, for every induction follows from the deduction of sets from the axiom of deduction.

c. Deductive Set Generation Implies the Priority of the Laws of Logic & Deductive Inference – It is not problematic for the atheist merely that an axiom precedes the atheist’s attempt to draw inductive inferences, nor is it problematic for the atheist merely that a necessary deduction precedes his inductive reasoning. What is even more problematic for the atheist here is the fact that set generation depends upon the laws of logic – viz. the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of the excluded middle – as well as the rules of inference. The laws identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, as well as the rules by which we may know if our deductively drawn conclusions are valid or invalid are propositions that precede the minds of all men. To whom, therefore, do these ideas belong?

§ VI. Does the Atheist Have Justification for his Belief?

Now that we have cleared away the brush from the atheist’s ambiguous language, we may ask –

Does the atheist have justification for asserting that God is not real?

No, he does not. This is so for the reasons we have established above, which we will now summarize very briefly.

1. The atheist does not, and cannot, have access to objective reality if he is confined to empirico-inductive reasoning. Because he cannot, and does not, have access to objective reality, he has no basis for believing that there is a collection of objects and attributes that are what they are apart from his subjective apprehension of them.

2. The atheist cannot verify that there is an objective reality, moreover, by appealing to the testimony of others. Because he has no access to objective reality, he can only subjectively apprehend the testimony of others. He also cannot justify his belief that these other minds are themselves objectively real, since he is not identical to them. He presupposes that his bodily activity correlates to his mental activity, with the body serving as a signifying mechanism to himself and others, but he cannot say that the same is true of others. Thus, even an appeal to the physical activities of others does not prove that they have minds like his own. He is, in the final analysis, confined to his subjectivity.

3. Inductive reasoning proceeds upon the basis of (a.) the axiom of induction, (b.) the deductive generation of sets, (c.) the laws of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, and (d.) the laws of deductive inference. The axiom of induction, the deductive generation of sets – i.e. the discursive application of the laws of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and deductive inference – are all immaterial content. Prior to induction, therefore, there are propositions that can be understood by finite minds, but which cannot be generated by finite minds.

In summation, the atheist’s belief that “God is not real” is one that he can only make by first presupposing that there is a mind that possesses and has generated universal truths apart from which man’s thinking cannot even get off of the ground. The atheist is not only unable to assert that God is not real, he is unable to assert that there is such a thing as reality at all.

§ VII. Is God Real?

Consequently, atheism is intelligible if an only if God is real; but if atheism is intelligible, then God is real, and atheism is necessarily false. This means that given atheism, atheism is logically possible but ontologically impossible. The assertion “God is not real” is proof that he is, in fact, real, and it implies that the atheist knows this to be true. This is so because the atheist utilizes universal truths – e.g. the laws of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, deductive inference, etc – which he believes will lead him to objective truth – i.e. knowledge of things as they are apart from his subjective apprehension of them. If the atheist truly does not view the laws mentioned above as anything more than social constructs, then he can offer his opinion about theism, as well as his opinions on any other matter – including, in fact, his opinions concerning what reality is – but he cannot hope to come to know the truth about theism or atheism, or any other matter. Professing himself to be wise, he has become a fool.

§ VIII. Concluding Remarks

In his paper “Atheism,” Gordon H. Clark, in accord with the view expressed by the present author, wrote the following –

At first it may seem strange that knowledge of what God is more important than knowledge that God is. His essence or nature being more important than his existence may seem unusual. Existentialists insist that existence precedes essence. Nevertheless, competent Christians disagree for two reasons. First, we have seen that pantheists identify god with the universe. What is god? —the universe. The mere fact that they use the name god for the universe and thus assert that god "exists" is of no help to Christianity.

The second reason for not being much interested in the existence of God is somewhat similar to the first. The idea existence is an idea without content. Stars exist—but this tells us nothing about the stars; mathematics exists—but this teaches us no mathematics; hallucinations also exist. The point is that a predicate, such as existence, that can be attached to everything indiscriminately tells us nothing about anything. A word, to mean something, must also not mean something. For example, if I say that some cats are black, the sentence has meaning only because some cats are white. If the adjective were attached to every possible subject—so all cats were black, all stars were black, and all politicians were black, as well as all the numbers in arithmetic, and God too—then the word black would have no meaning. It would not distinguish anything from something else. Since everything exists, exists is devoid of information. That is why the Catechism asks, What is God? Not, Does God exist?10

Clark understood that the question of God’s “existence” needed to be clarified in order to be understood and addressed. Once this is done, it is plain to see that atheists are not concerned with the “existence” of God but with his “reality.” This “reality” must be defined as well, but for the atheist there is no way of justifying a concept of such an objective “reality.” Apart from a non-empirical, disembodied, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, omnipresent mind, the universal truths requisite to cogent reasoning and speculation in the matters of metaphysics, epistemology, and even science do not “exist,” i.e. are not “real.” They are, instead, mere assertions whose truth value is uncritically accepted by the atheist in his complaints against Christianity.

In his attempt to identify God as unreal, the atheist turns to creation and imbues it with divinity. Not only does matter become the source of all power, all order, all modes of being, all knowledge, all history, whose ever evasive essence can only be known by a process of negative abstraction from reflection on physical things (i.e. the via negativa) – it becomes the teleological terminus of all of the atheist’s thinking and acting. Whereas Christianity loudly proclaims Soli Deo Gloria!, the atheist affirms Solam Materiam Gloria! And by so doing confirms that his lack of belief in other gods, including the one true God, does not indicate that he lacks belief in all gods. For the atheist, there is only one ontological entity greater than which none may be conceived; and that entity we all know as Matter.

1 Rom 1:19-21.
2 Rom 1:23.
3 The Expositor’s Bible Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008), 267.
4 “What is an Atheist?,” American Atheists, https://www.atheists.org/activism/resources/about-atheism, Accessed March 22, 2019.
5 ibid.
6 ibid.
7 ibid.
8 “Atheism and Agnosticism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/, Accessed March 22, 2019.
9 This should be understood in the ontological sense.
10 “Atheism,” Trinity Foundation, http://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/The%20Trinity%20Review%200032a%20Atheism.pdf, Accessed April 25, 2019, 3.

Had it not been primarily for the work of John Robbins and The Trinity Foundation, the legacy and theology of Gordon H. Clark might have largely fallen into obscurity and Clark himself would have remained an unknown figure to many in this new generation of believers. At the present time, there is a small, but ever-growing, movement of believers that is dedicated to rediscovering and promoting the views of Gordon Clark. What these writers, bloggers, podcasters, and pastors have discovered however in their attempt to promote the ideas of Clark is that he has largely been ignored and misrepresented as much as he has been attacked and marginalized. Unfortunately, this has led many people to believe things about Clark that are wrong and it has caused many others to dismiss him without properly understanding his views. Clark is not difficult to understand for those who may wish to read his work for themselves. Moreover, his contributions to the faith are significant and should be given serious consideration. The problem today is that many persist in rejecting Clark and continue to speak out against him while remaining ignorant of what he said and wrote. While many who disagree with Clark profess to have read him, often their bias against him is outweighed only by their ignorance of him. We have encountered many followers of Cornelius Van Til who adamantly disagree with Clark and yet do not understand or represent him accurately. The purpose of this article is to showcase one such example and to present an argument in favor of Clark’s criticism against Van Til’s notion of analogy, as it was presented in “The Complaint.”

Recently Tyler Vela of The Freed Thinker Podcast attempted to argue against Clark’s criticism of Van Til’s notion of analogy and in the process demonstrated his ignorance of Clark and the issue. The discussion ensued shortly after I posted the following comment to the Bible Thumping Wingnut Facebook group.

Original Post

We do not just have an analogy of the truth we have the truth itself, and this in no way harms the Creator/ creature distinction.

This post was meant to express a favorable disposition of Clark’s view with regards to the most disputed theological topic in the Clark-Van Til Controversy. It is possible, however, that some readers may not be familiar with the controversy.

Following in the tradition of his father and grandfather, Clark sought to become an ordained minister in the faith and to that end he was ordained as a teaching elder in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church by the Philadelphia Presbytery on August 9, 1944. But shortly after he was ordained to the ministry, a protest ensued as 12 elders, including Cornelius Van Til, issued a formal complaint against his ordination. These elders produced a document, which came to be known as “The Complaint.” This document, which was read during a meeting of the Presbytery of Philadelphia on November 20, 1944, would lay the groundwork for what later became known as the “Clark-Van Til Controversy.” The document identified four theological topics of the dispute but the main theological point of dispute was over the incomprehensibility of God. This dispute over the incomprehensibility of God was chiefly concerned with the way in which man’s knowledge relates to God’s knowledge.

Doug Douma, author of The Presbyterian Philosopher points out the following:

Van Til used the term "analogy" to describe the relationship between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge… Van Til used "analogy" to mean that man’s knowledge itself is an analogy of God’s knowledge... Echoing Van Til, “The Complaint” declared, "Because of his very nature as infinite and absolute the knowledge which God possesses of himself and of all things must remain a mystery which the finite mind of man cannot penetrate." And in the strongest form possible, the phrase for which “The Complaint” became most well-known, "We dare not maintain that [God's] knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point."

In critiquing Van Til’s theory of analogy, Clark argued that if God’s knowledge has no point in common with ours, then we know nothing that is true, for God knows all truths. In “The Answer,” [a response to “The Complaint”] his arguments for this conclusion is presented; ‘The Presbytery wishes to suggest that if man does not know at least one truth that God knows, if man’s knowledge and God’s knowledge do not coincide in at least one detail, then man knows nothing at all. God knows all truth, and if man’s mind cannot grasp one truth, then man’s mind grasps no truth. Far from being a test of orthodoxy, this test imposed by “The Complaint” is nothing else than skepticism and irrationalism."[i]

Clark argued that skepticism and irrationalism were the results of Van Til’s position. Dr. Gary Crampton has also argued this point against Van Til's notion of analogy. Crampton writes,

...there is the Van Tilian notion of analogy; that is, that all human knowledge is, and can only be, analogical to God’s knowledge. There is no point at which God’s knowledge meets man’s knowledge. Dr. Van Til is not just teaching that there is a difference in the quantity of God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge (a belief with which all Christians should agree), but that there is also a difference in the content of knowledge. Astonishingly, Dr. Van Til writes: Man could not have the same thought content in his mind that God has in His mind unless he were himself divine. Elsewhere he states that man’s knowledge of God and His Word is at no point identical with the content of God’s mind. And it is because of the fact that all human knowledge is only analogical to God’s knowledge that all teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory.

Such a view, if carried to its logical conclusion, would lead to complete skepticism.[ii]

This quote from Crampton’s article was the one that was posted on the original thread in the comments section in the hope that it would explain, in more detail, the position taken with respect to the original post. Crampton points out the same thing Clark himself pointed out, namely that this view of Van Til's leads to skepticism. However, Tyler replied that “the claim that it would lead to skepticism is just absurd because it ignores the fact of revelatory knowledge based on Scriptures.”

In response to Tyler's comments, I stated, “That is the logically necessary result of such a position.” Tyler then challenged me to produce a syllogism to show this to be the case. Tyler wrote, “Without citing ideological articles, can you present the syllogism that shows it is logically NECESSARY?” He then provided his own syllogism which, unfortunately for him, only served to highlight his failure to grasp the substance of the Clarkian criticism. Tyler wrote:

1 What God has revealed, we can know.

2 God has revealed reliable anthropomorphic truths about himself.

Therefore,

We can have reliable anthropomorphic knowledge of God.

I don’t see how that “logically necessitates” skepticism.

The reason Tyler can’t “see how that [syllogism] ‘logically necessitates’ skepticism” is that it doesn’t, and that is not what Clark said would lead to skepticism. Clark never denied the use of analogies or anthropomorphisms in relation to our knowledge of God or anything thing else for that matter. With such confusion, it is no wonder then that Tyler can’t “see how that ‘logically necessitates’ skepticism.” In the original conversation thread, I quoted and agreed with Crampton who wrote, “Such a view, if carried to its logical conclusion, would lead to complete skepticism.” What view was Crampton referring too? Was it that “God has revealed anthropomorphic truths about himself and therefore, we can have reliable anthropomorphic knowledge of God” as Tyler argued in his syllogism? No, it was the view that “all human knowledge is, and can only be, analogical to God’s knowledge.” The contention, which Tyler apparently failed to grasp, was not over analogical knowledge of God but rather over the idea that all of man’s knowledge is analogical and that there is no point at which God’s knowledge meets man’s knowledge. Simply put, Van Til did not do what Tyler has done in that syllogism; that is to limit the use of analogy to our knowledge of God. Van Til wrote, “The fact that man’s knowledge must always remain analogical is applicable to his knowledge of God as well as to his knowledge of the universe.”[iii] Van Til held that all our knowledge was analogical and that is partly what Clarkians argue will lead to skepticism if drawn to its logical conclusion. Unfortunately, this reveals a significant lack of understanding on Tyler’s part. He would later go on to ask, “Does God have a mighty arm or is it [an] analogy? If it is an analogy, does it not teach us anything that we can then know about God? Does that fact that it is analogy mean that we are stuck with abject skepticism of what it means.” Again, this is highly revealing on Tyler’s part.

In order to properly address Tyler’s confusion, we will answer his questions more directly as we consider what Clark wrote about analogy. Then we will address the overlying issue at hand and examine Van Til’s notion of analogy from two different points of consideration. First, we will examine the notion “that all human knowledge is, and can only be, analogical to God’s knowledge.” Then we will examine Van Til’s notion. “that [God’s] knowledge and our knowledge [do not] coincide at any single point.”

Does Analogy automatically lead to “abject skepticism?"

First, let’s look at what Clark wrote and then we can answer Tyler’s questions more directly. Clark wrote,

Of course, there are figures of speech, metaphors, anthropomorphisms, [analogies] and the like. But these would be meaningless if there were no literal statements to give them meaning. For example, 2 Chronicles 16:9 - “The eyes of the Lord run to and fro throughout the whole earth” - is ludicrously ridiculous if taken literally: little eyeballs rolling over the dusty ground. But unless the statement, God is omniscient, is literal, the figure has nothing to refer to.[iv]

Now let’s answer Tyler's questions, “Does God have a mighty arm or is it analogy. If it is analogy, does it not teach us anything that we can then know about God?” Of course, it is an analogy, but unless there is a literal truth, such as God is powerful and mighty, to give it meaning then it tells us nothing about God. Tyler then asked, “Does the fact that it is analogy mean that we are stuck with abject skepticism of what it means.” Again, this is not what Clark or his followers argue will lead to skepticism so the answer is no, not if there is a literal statement to give it meaning. Tyler apparently thinks that Clarkians believe analogy automatically leads to skepticism. If he had read Clark for himself then he may have read when Clark wrote the following.

Those who defend the Bible as a true revelation must insist that it conveys literal truth. This does not mean the God cannot sometimes use symbolism and metaphor [or analogy]. Of course, there is symbolism in Ezekiel, there are parables in the gospels, and there are metaphors scattered throughout. God might have used even mythology and fable. But unless there are literal statements along with these figures of speech - or at the very least, unless figures of speech can be translated into literal truth - a book conveys no definite meaning.

Let a person say that the cross symbolizes the love of God. However, if all language or all religious language is symbolical, the statement that the cross symbolizes the love of God is itself a symbol. A symbol of what? When this last question is answered, we shall find that this answer is again a symbol. Then another symbol will be needed, and another. And the whole process will be meaningless.

This contemporary theory of language is open to the same objections that were raised against the Thomistic [and the Van Tilian] notion of analogical knowledge. In order to have meaning, an analogy, a metaphor, or a symbol must be supported by some literal truth. If Samson was as strong as an ox, then an ox must literally be strong. If Christ is the lion of the tribe of Judah, then something must be literally true about lions and about Christ also. No matter with what literary embellishment the comparison be made there must be a strictly true statement that has given rise to it. And a theory that says all language is symbolic is a theory that cannot be taken as literally true.[v]

Clearly then, Clark did not reject the use of analogy, symbolism, or anthropomorphism. Nor did he claim that analogical or anthropomorphic descriptions of God would automatically lead to skepticism. This level of confusion and ignorance raises suspicion for one who claims to have read both sides. Tyler is without excuse because he was encouraged to, “read some Gordon Clark,” to which he replied, “I have read Clark.” After I quoted Crampton I stated that Clark had already refuted Van Til’s notion of analogy to which Tyler responded by saying, “‘Refuted’ is FAR too strong a term btw. Almost laughably so to anyone who had read both sides.” Is it not “the fool [who] rages and laughs.” (Proverbs 29:9) Tyler ought to be careful if he finds himself tempted to laugh at Clark or his followers. But perhaps he was merely posturing in the discussion when he claimed to have read both sides. After this encounter with Tyler, I seriously doubt he has read both sides.

All of this is to merely to highlight Tyler's confusion and what many Van Tilians tend to do in discussions about Clark. Their obstinacy toward Clark is outweighed only by their ignorance of Clark. But Tyler did request a Syllogism to demonstrate that Van Til’s view of analogy logically necessitated skepticism.

All Human Knowledge Is Analogical

It would appear by and large that when Van Tilians make the claim that all of man’s knowledge is analogical to God’s knowledge they intend for this proposition to be regarded as something that is literally true. However, we can provide a syllogism to show that this is only can only be an analogy.

Premise 1: All man's knowledge is analogical to God’s Knowledge

Premise 2: "All man's knowledge is analogical to God's knowledge" is a knowledge claim made by a man

Conclusion: Therefore "all man's knowledge is analogical to God's knowledge" is an analogy.

Clark had already pointed this out when he wrote:

On the complainants’ theory, the proposition “the truth man has is analogical” is itself only an analogy. It is not the truth that God has. Nor could man know that it was God who was revealing such a proposition, for again the proposition “God is revealing that truth is analogical” is only an analogy of the truth. ("The Answer" Pg 22)

If this proposition, all man’s knowledge is analogical, is not to be regarded as literally true then it must be analogous to something that is literally true. To understand the analogy, we must also know and understand the literal truth which gives it meaning. It is important to recognize that the truth of Jesus’ parables was obscured from those who were not given the literal meaning of the parable. In Luke 8:4-8 we read the parable of the sower.

⁴ And when a great crowd was gathering and people from town after town came to him, he said in a parable, ⁵ "A sower went out to sow his seed. And as he sowed, some fell along the path and was trampled underfoot, and the birds of the air devoured it. ⁶ And some fell on the rock, and as it grew up, it withered away, because it had no moisture. ⁷ And some fell among thorns, and the thorns grew up with it and choked it. ⁸ And some fell into good soil and grew and yielded a hundredfold." As he said these things, he called out, "He who has ears to hear, let him hear.

Jesus gives the parable and it is clear from the text that nobody understood what it meant until he provided the literal meaning of the parable. In verses 9-10 we read, "⁹ And when his disciples asked him what this parable meant, ¹⁰ he said, 'To you it has been given to know the secrets of the kingdom of God, but for others they are in parables, so that 'seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not understand.'" All that the “others” were given was a parable or an analogy, and although they heard they did not understand. If all we have is an analogy with no support or connection to a literal truth then we are no better off than these people. Therefore, Jesus had to take his disciples aside and give them the literal meaning of the parable so that they might understand.

¹¹ Now the parable is this: The seed is [analogous to] the word of God. ¹² The ones along the path are [analogous to] those who have heard; then the devil [the birds are an analogy of the devil] comes and takes away the word from their hearts, so that they may not believe and be saved. ¹³ And the ones on the rock are [analogous to] those who, when they hear the word, receive it with joy. But these have no root; they believe for a while, and in time of testing fall away. ¹⁴ And as for what fell among the thorns, they are [analogous to] those who hear, but as they go on their way they are choked by the cares and riches and pleasures of life, and their fruit does not mature. ¹⁵ As for that in the good soil, they are [analogous to] those who, hearing the word, hold it fast in an honest and good heart, and bear fruit with patience. (Luke 8:9-15)

It’s also important to remember that we can draw a valid deduction from a false premise. As a Clarkian, I'm not interested in defending Van Til’s irrational notion of analogy and I would argue that the first premise is false. I do not believe that all of man’s knowledge is analogical. Here I'm going to give Tyler an ad hominem reply and accept the first premise as true for the sake of argument. Unfortunately, however, before we can proceed any further, we must correct a very common misunderstanding, one which Tyler has previously made, that all ad hominem replies are fallacious. Here we must caution the would-be philosopher to avoid making this mistake. Gordon Clark wrote:

ad hominem – Latin meaning “to the man.” A form of argument that accepts a proposition espoused by another for the purpose of deducing from it contradictory propositions or propositions that would be rejected by the other person. AD HOMINEM SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE INFORMAL FALLACY OF ABUSIVE AD HOMINEM. (Emphasis Clark’s)[vi]

Clark rightly distinguished between an ad hominem reply and an abusive ad hominem fallacy. This view, though largely misunderstood, is not particular to Clark. I am going to accept the proposition “all man’s knowledge is analogical to God’s knowledge,” which accurately reflects Van Til’s notion of analogy, for the purpose of deducing from it contradictory propositions or propositions that would be rejected by Tyler. First, we will use the Modus Ponens syllogism to show it to be self-contradictory if it is to be taken as literally true. Then we will use the Modus Tollens syllogism to reduce it to absurdity if it is not to be taken as literally true. Since we have shown that the claim, “all man’s knowledge is analogical to God’s knowledge” is itself an analogy we can proceed to show that it is self-contradictory if the Van Tilian intends for it to be taken as literally true. To do this we will use of a Modus Ponens syllogism.

Premise 1: (If P) If the claim "all human knowledge is analogical to God's knowledge" is an analogy (then Q) then it cannot be literally true.

Premise: 2 (P) The claim is an analogy

Conclusion: (Therefore Q) Therefore it cannot be literally true.

It would appear that the Van Tilian claim, that all knowledge is analogical, is to be regarded as literally true. If that is the case then it is clearly self-contradictory and therefore self-refuting. We should also point out that the mind is compelled to reject contradictions because we are made in the image of God and it is only by suppressing the truth that they are maintained and professed. However, if the knowledge claim itself is not literal but analogical then it must be supported by some literal truth if it is to convey any truth or meaning. We can show by using the Modus Tollens syllogism how this is reduced to absurdity and leads to a position that Tyler and every other Van Tilian would reject.

Premise 1: (If P) If this analogy "all human knowledge is analogical to God's knowledge" is to convey any truth or meaning (then Q) then it must be supported by some literal truth which is knowable to man.

Premise 2: (Not Q) No literal truth is accessible to man for all of man’s knowledge is analogical

Conclusion: (Therefore Not P) therefore this analogy conveys no truth or meaning.

First, we showed that Van Til’s notion of analogy is itself an analogy. Then we gave an ad hominem reply and accepted the position as true so for the sake of argument in order to show it to be either self-contradictory or absurd. We used the Modus Ponens syllogism to show that if this analogy is to be regarded as literally true then it is self-contradictory and therefore must be false. We then used the Modus Tollens syllogism to show that if it is not to be regarded as literal but rather it is analogical then it is reduced to absurdity on the account that it conveys not truth or meaning. Certainly, Tyler would reject these propositions, which have been properly deduced from Van Til’s theory of analogy.

No Point of Coincidence

By this point, the problem with Van Til's notion of analogy should clear but let’s take it a little further and address some of Tyler’s other points. Tyler argued,

Again, do the analogies contained within scripture not teach us real truth? As a Clarkian, IF your argument were valid, [Clark’s arguments are valid] you would have just undermined all truths of scripture learned via analogy, anthropomorphism, metaphor, symbolism, etc. You see the irony of a Clarkian doing that? If a Clarkian wants to say that analogous knowledge has no truth value then they have undermined ALL non-didactic/straight historic sections of the scripture as having any truth value.

First, we need to point out again that the Clarkian criticism is not leveled against the use of analogy itself, but rather it is leveled against Van Til's theory of analogy. If Tyler understood this then he wouldn’t be asking such questions. Tyler stated, “IF your argument were valid [they are valid], you would have just undermined all truths of scripture learned via analogy, anthropomorphism, metaphor, symbolism, etc. You see the irony of a Clarkian doing that right?” The true irony in all this is that it was Van Til's notion of analogy that undermined “all truths of scripture learned via analogy, anthropomorphism, metaphor, symbolism, etc.” Again, no Clarkian is saying that “analogous knowledge has no truth value” and we have not undermined “ALL non-didactic/straight historic sections of the scripture” because neither Clark nor his followers have rejected the use of analogy or made the claim that it has “no truth value.”

Tyler doesn’t understand the substance of the debate especially when he makes comments like the following:

Just because I don't believe we have knowledge in the same way that God has knowledge doesn't entail skepticism, let alone make it "logically necessary.”

This shows once again that Tyler does not grasp the actual issue. Clarkians also “don't believe we have knowledge in the same way that God has knowledge,” and neither do we believe that this is what will, “entail skepticism, let alone make it ‘logically necessary.’” Dr. Reymond wrote, “It is important to note here that it is not the way that God and human beings know a thing that "The Complaint" declares is different. Both the complaints and Clark agreed that God knows everything by eternal intuition whereas people learn what they know (excluding certain innate ideas) discursively. Rather, insists Van Til and certain of his students, it is the content of man’s knowledge that is qualitatively distinct from God’s knowledge.”[vii]

"The Complaint" which declared, “We dare not maintain that [God’s] knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point,” also stated that it was a “tragic fact” that Clark’s position, “has lead him to obliterate the qualitative distinction between the contents of the divine mind and the knowledge which is possible to the creature.” In other words, Van Til and his cohorts accused Clark of harming the Creator/ creature distinction and insisted that in order to maintain that distinction we must maintain that our knowledge does not coincide with God’s knowledge at any single point. This is what the actual issue was over. So let’s take a closer look at these positions.

The problem that Van Til faced was similar to, if not the same, to that of Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) with respect to his theory of analogy. Aquinas was the first theologian to propose the use of analogy as a way of explaining the relation of being between God and man. This point of criticism against Van Til by way of comparison to Aquinas is nothing new and most well informed Van Tilians are aware of it. Dr. Scott Oliphint has stated the following.

Van Til’s notion of “analogy” or “analogical,” as it applies to knowledge and to predication, is central to his theology and apologetic.  Though the term itself is confusing in that it carries with it a host of assumptions in Thomism, it should not be confused or in any way identified with Thomas’s understanding of analogy.  Though for Thomas there was an analogy of being, for Van Til, the notion of analogy was meant to communicate the ontological and epistemological difference between God and man.  This difference has been expressed historically in terms of an archetypal/ ectypal relationship.[viii]

Despite all attempts by Van Til’s disciples to rescue his theory of analogy from criticism by distinguishing it from that of Thomas Aquinas’ the problem of skepticism still persisted. Let’s take a moment to ask why as we examine the issue. Dr. Oliphint pointed out that for Thomas there was an analogy of being which is to say that he held that nothing can be predicated of God and man in a univocal sense. Dr. Reymond points out, “A given predicate applied to separate subjects [such as God and man] univocally would intend that the subjects possess the predicate in a precisely identical sense.”[ix] This is why we cannot say for example, that both God and man are “intelligent, good or upright” in a univocal sense. This would imply that both God and man possess the predicates “intelligent, good or upright” in a precisely identical sense and Aquinas recognized that this would destroy the Creator-creature distinction.

However, the opposite of univocality is equivocality and it has its own problem. A given predicate applied to separate subjects equivocally would intend that the subjects possess the predicate in a completely unrelated and altogether different sense. Aquinas also understood that to suggest that God and man are “intelligent, good or upright” in a completely equivocal sense would result in utter skepticism for it would be completely ambiguous. In sum, a complete univocality destroys the Creator-creature distinction while a complete equivocality results in skepticism. Therefore, Aquinas proposed the use of “proportionality or analogy” as a third option for univocality and equivocality. This means that when we say, for example, that “God and man are intelligent,” it is analogical in the sense that God’s intelligence is proportional to God’s intelligence as man’s intelligence is proportional to man’s intelligence and it also means that the “intelligence” intended cannot be the same for both God and man. This sounds all well and good until we remember that Aquinas held that nothing could be predicated in the univocal sense between God and man. But why is this a problem? It is because the only thing that can keep an analogy from becoming a complete equivocality is the univocal element that is implicit within it. Dr. Reymond points out,

If I assert that an analogy may be drawn between an apple and an orange, do I not intend to suggest that the apple and the orange, obviously different in some respects, are the same in at least one respect? Why otherwise would I draw attention to the relationship between them? While it is true that the one respect in which I perceive that they are similar will not be immediately apparent to anyone else without further explanation on my part, it should be clear nonetheless to everyone, if I asserted that they are analogous one to the other, that I believe that in some sense a univocal feature exists between them--in this case, it may be that I have in mind that they are both fruit, or that they are both spherical, or that they both have extension in space and have mass. I intend to suggest that, for all their differences, they have something in common.[x]

The same is true for the univocal elements which are implicit in the parable of the sower. Christ was asserting that an analogy can be drawn between a seed and the word of God. To borrow the language of Dr. Reymond, Christ is clearly suggesting to his disciples that the seed and the word of God, although different in many ways, are the same in at least one respect. Why else would he be drawing their attention to them? It is true that the one respect in which Jesus perceive that the seed and the word of God are similar was not immediately apparent to anyone else without further explanation on his part but “it should be clear nonetheless to everyone, if [Christ] asserted that they are analogous one to the other, that [he did] believe that in some sense a univocal feature exist between them.” In this case, it is that both the word of God and the seed must take root and grow in good soil in order to have the proper effects of life, growth and bearing fruit. The univocal features for the rest of the parable are further explained by Christ. For example, the univocal feature between the birds and the devil is that they both come to take away the seed. The univocal feature between those whom the path represents and the path itself is that they both have left the seed open to attack. That is to say that they have heard the word, which has fallen on deaf ears, just as if the seed has fallen on the ground by the wayside. The word of God has not sunk into their hearts and minds just as the seed has not sunk into the ground. These people hear the word of God, do not care, do not meditate on it or think deeply about it, and are altogether intellectually shallow. So then, the word of God, which the seed, represents is left open to attack and the word is easily plucked out by the devil who snatches it away like a bird snatches the seed from the ground.

Is it not obvious then, that for all the differences between these subjects if an analogy is drawn between them then there must be something that is equally true of both of them. It is the predicate that indicates that they have something in common. The problem with Aquinas was that he denied any univocal coincidence in prediction between God and man. Therefore, he could not avoid equivocality because he could not account for the univocal elements within his theory of analogy. Van Til’s view faced the same problem, for he held that all of man’s knowledge was analogical to God’s knowledge and God’s knowledge and our knowledge did not coincide at any single point. This did not allow for any univocal element within his view of analogy and therefore he could avoid total equivocality. Dr. Reymond writes, “It is difficult to see how, with his explicit rejection of the univocal element (see his “corresponds at no single point”) in man’s so-called “analogical” knowledge of God, Van Til can rescue such knowledge from being in actuality a total equivocality and no true knowledge at all. Doug Douma points out that Paul Moser is quoted as saying, “Admittedly, Van Til’s theory of analogy is not identical with that of Thomas; but the distinction between the two is not one that commends Van Til’s theory; for his view if held consistently, implies pure equivocism.”[xi]

To be sure, and to satisfy Tyler’s demands for a syllogism, for otherwise, he may not see the points being made, let’s give another ad hominem reply. Let’s accept the position that Van Til and the other faculty members who signed "The Complaint" put forth for the sake of argument and deduce from it propositions that Tyler would be forced to reject. We can show this by virtue of two Modus Tollens syllogism.

Premise 1: (If P) If man is to knows any truth at all (Then Q) then man’s knowledge must coincide with God’s knowledge at some point for God knows all truth.

Premise 2: (Not Q) Man’s knowledge does not coincide with God’s knowledge at any single point.

Conclusion: (Therefore Not P) Therefore man does not know any truth at all.

Premise 1: (If P) If Van Til’s notion of analogy is to keep from becoming a complete equivocality (Then Q) then his notion of analogy must allow for a univocal feature to be contained within an analogy

Premise 2: (Not Q) Van Til’s notion of analogy does not allow for a univocal feature to be contained within an analogy

Conclusion: (Therefore Not P) Therefore Van Til’s notion of analogy cannot keep from becoming a complete equivocality.

Conclusion

Certainly, much more could be said on this but for now this will suffice. It is worth noting that perhaps Aquinas’ theory of analogy could have been salvaged if he instead held that nothing can be predicated of God and man in a completely univocal sense. Perhaps too, Van Til’s theory of analogy could have been salvaged during the controversy if he would have allowed for a point of coincidence between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. Unfortunately, however, that was not the case and it is why Clark said, “Unless the analogy is based on a literal and univocal similarity, there could be no analogy at all. And I would use this argument to pay my respects to Thomas Aquinas and Cornelius Van Til.” (Clark - Language, Truth, and Revelation, Part 1, minute 27)[xii] It is likely that Van Til and the other complainants felt the full weight of Clark’s criticism because they later conceded to his arguments and accepted a “point of contact” between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. They also attempted to change the definition of “content.” Clark’s criticism was utterly devastating![xiii]

It is worth noting that it was here on this hill of analogy that Van Til so fervently fought against the ordination of Gordon Clark. This was the hill the complainants erected and it was the hill they defended during the controversy. Let the reader of this article note that I, a Clarkian, have just used "hill" as an analogy for "theological position." When we draw out the Van Til position, as established by "The Complaint," to its logical conclusion we are left with skepticism. This is the Clarkian position and more importantly, it is the Biblical position.

[i] DOUMA, DOUG J. "The Arguments of The Ordination Controversy." PRESBYTERIAN PHILOSOPHER. S.l.: WIPF & STOCK PUB, 2017. 112-14. Print.

[ii] Crampton, W. Gary. "Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis." Trinity Foundation. Trinity Foundation, June-July 2000. Web. 02 June 2017. <http://trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=128>.

[iii] Til, Cornelius Van. A Survey of Christian Epistemology. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980.Presuppositionalism 101. Web. Apr.-May 2017. <https://presupp101.wordpress.com/downloads/>.

[iv] Clark, Gordon Haddon. God's Hammer: The Bible and Its Critics. Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2011. Print

[v]. Clark, Gordon Haddon. God's Hammer: The Bible and Its Critics. Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2011. Print.

[vi] Clark, Gordon Haddon. Logic. Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2004. Print.

[vii] Reymond, Robert L. A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith. Second ed. Nashville: T. Nelson, 2001. Print.

[viii] Til, Cornelius Van, and K. Scott Oliphint. The Defense of the Faith. Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Pub., 2008. 62. Print.

[ix] Reymond, Robert L. A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith. Second ed. Nashville: T. Nelson, 2001. Print.

[x] Reymond, Robert L. A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith. Second ed. Nashville: T. Nelson, 2001. Print.

[xi] DOUMA, DOUG J. "The Arguments of The Ordination Controversy." PRESBYTERIAN PHILOSOPHER. S.l.: WIPF & STOCK PUB, 2017. 112-14. Print.

[xii] This quote was found by Doug Douma and provide in the footnotes of his book.

[xiii] For more information on the change in Van Til’s position the reader of this article is encouraged to read: DOUMA, DOUG J. "Chapter 8, The Continued Controversy and Its Results."PRESBYTERIAN PHILOSOPHER. S.l.: WIPF & STOCK PUB, 2017. 157-62. Print.

Updated 11/30/2020

What makes a true Clarkian? How much and what do you have to agree with Clark on? Which of Clark’s protégés carries the truest banner of his legacy? These questions have stirred much controversy and division amongst those who follow the teachings of Reformed philosopher-theologian Gordon Haddon Clark.

But such questions are distractions. What’s far more important than identifying “true” Clarkians is to understand what Clark himself taught, know how to evaluate secondary sources, and develop the maturity to disagree biblically, whether it’s with Clark, Clarkians, or other Christians, without unnecessary denouncements. It's foolish to judge who is or isn't a "true" Clarkian; it only damages Clark's legacy and breeds unnecessary infighting, and the history of some of Clark's followers sadly attests to this even now. All of us who value Clark—especially the coming generation of pastors, preachers, teachers—would do well to get along. There's already too much internal strife as it is, and while Clark’s influence is slowly growing, we’re still a small piece of the Reformed pie.

This isn’t the worst-case scenario we’ve witnessed, but Jason Petersen, a student at Whitefield Theological Seminary, recently denounced Luke Miner, a Scripturalism.com contributor (Jason is also a contributor), as a self-deceived Clarkian. Jason recounts in his blog:

While I have no doubt that Luke believes he is a Clarkian, he is not a Clarkian. Clark never defined knowledge as justified-true belief, yet Luke attempted to articulate (in a different thread) that notion in the Clarkian Apologetics [Facebook] Group (or at the very least, that “true belief” is not enough and that a qualifier is needed. Clark would never agree with this).  Clark instead defined knowledge as true belief, or more specifically, possession of the truth by a mind. This, and my conversation with Luke, is exactly why I proclaimed that he is not a Clarkian. Perhaps he respects Clark and agrees with him on many aspects (such as Clark’s rejection of metaphysics), but he should not call himself a Clarkian.[1]

According to Jason, a "true" Clarkian must at least agree with Clark's epistemology and maintain key terms as Clark defined them, that is, according to Jason's interpretation. Jason is making amends with Luke and others involved, though Luke "and Cjay will remain out of the [Clarkian Apologetics Facebook] group."[2]

We don’t care for petty conflicts, but this illustrates a growing tendency in some. If these little foxes are left unchecked, they will ruin their vineyard. The biblical and productive approach is to simply correct misunderstandings or misrepresentations of Clark, without pronouncements as to who the "real" Clarkian is. Especially because the accuser could be wrong. Those who denounce fellow Clarkians this way resemble Diotrephes,

who likes to put himself first, [and] does not acknowledge our authority. So if I come, I will bring up what he is doing, talking wicked nonsense against us. And not content with that, he refuses to welcome the brothers, and also stops those who want to and puts them out of the church.  (3 John 9-10)

Does Jason "like to put himself first"? Judge for yourselves:

Imagine being a professor and then having a student try to take over the class. Anyone who knows me is aware that I have little tolerance for such antics. It is also worthy to note that the Clarkian Apologetics Group is a direct product of the Gordon Clark Foundation, which, by the way, endorses this [Jason's] website.[3]

Isn’t this the carnal sectarianism that Paul warned against in 1 Corinthians 1:10-17, 3:1-4? For when one says, "I am of Clark and you are not," are you not carnal? Is Christ divided? It is a sad but common practice in our day for immature believers to seek online platforms and tout spiritual influence and authority when they’re neither ready nor qualified nor called by God to do so. “Therefore let anyone who thinks that he stands take heed lest he fall” (1 Cor. 10:12).

A Justified True Clarkian

In any case, is Jason's claim true, that Clark rejected justified true belief (JTB) and "instead defined knowledge as true belief, or more specifically, possession of the truth by a mind"? Not according to Clark himself:

A systematic philosophy must take care of epistemology. Knowledge must be accounted for. It may be that the a priori forms cannot be listed; it may be that botany or some other subject remains obscure; but knowledge of some sort must be provided.[4] ..................................................

What account shall be given of everyday “knowledge” that common sense thinks it silly to doubt? Don’t I know when I am hungry? Can’t I use road maps to drive to Boston to Los Angeles? Indeed, how can I know what the Bible says without reading its pages with my own eyes? It was one secular philosopher criticizing another, who said that knowledge is a fact and that any theory that did not account for it should be abandoned. But all such criticisms miss the point. The status of common opinion is not fixed until a theory has been accepted. One may admit that a number of propositions commonly believed are true; but no one can deny that many such are false. The problem is to elaborate a method by which the two classes can be distinguished. Plato, too, granted a place to opinion as distinct from knowledge; he even admitted that in some circumstances opinion was as useful as knowledge with a capital K. But to dispose of the whole matter by an appeal to road maps that we can see with our own eyes is to ignore everything said above about Aristotle.[5]

Clark then proceeds by arguing that there is no account of this common sense “knowledge,” and is thus not knowledge but opinion. For an opinion to be knowledge it must be both true and accounted for. Clark's unpublished paper on Plato’s theory of knowledge from the Gordon H. Clark Foundation runs along the same lines:

The term “knowledge” is very ambiguous, and, until all its meanings have been revealed, false judgment cannot really be explained. Socrates’ discussion has pointed out some of its meaning. Plato’s analysis of false judgment is included in the Sophist when the Forms have been introduced.

The “pieces of knowledge” stored in the mind are no more than true beliefs. Our attitude toward a false belief is the same as it is toward a true one. Our confidence in belief is not based on reason. Socrates contrasts a jury’s second-hand belief when convinced of the facts to the direct knowledge of the eye-witness who has seen the fact. Even if the jury finds the right verdict, they are still judging without knowledge, only belief. If true belief and knowledge were the same, a juryman could never have a correct belief without knowledge. Therefore, knowledge cannot be defined as true belief.

True belief lacked something which was necessary in order to call it knowledge. So Theaetetus suggests that knowledge is true belief accompanied by an account or explanation. Plato considers the various possible meanings of “account” and finally rejects the suggestion. The account is not enough to raise correct opinion to the level of knowledge.[6]

In Lord God of Truth Clark again concurs with Plato:

Accordingly the knowledge possible for human beings consists of the axioms of and the deductions from Scripture. We can indeed entertain opinions about Columbus, and by accident or good luck they may be true; but we could not know it. Our dear pagan Plato, at the end of his Meno (98b) declared, "That there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge (ōrtheme) is not at all a conjecture with me, but something I would particularly assert that I knew."[7]

While Clark doesn't necessarily use the term justified true belief—likely because it didn’t gain traction til the late 1970’s,[8] and he died in 1985—he clearly affirms the concept. He agrees with Plato on the distinction between belief/opinion and knowledge, as do many of his pupils. So according to his standard of "true" Clarkianism, Jason would also have to denounce Clark himself, as well as Clarkians who are more knowledgeable such as Sean Gerety, Robert Reymond, John Robbins, Gary Crampton, and even his mentor Kenneth Talbot. While Jason claims that "Clark never defined knowledge as justified-true belief,” Sean Gerety

find[s] it strange how many who claim to hold to the biblical epistemology of Gordon Clark fail to understand even the first principles of his theory. For Clark knowledge requires an account. That is, for a proposition to rise to the level of knowledge it has to be justified.[9]

Gerety explains that "knowledge, which is true belief with an account of its truth, or, simply, justified true belief (belief being the operative word), is the gift of God."[10]  In The Justification of Knowledge—the title itself is a dead giveaway—Robert Reymond argues that

Clark is a brilliant Reformed philosopher–theologian. I deeply appreciate the reflection of the Reformed view of Scripture in his assumption, on dogmatic grounds, of the self–authenticating Word of God as his axiom for knowing God or anything else as it ought to be known. I concur with him that unless one begins with God he will not arrive at a knowledge of God, nor will he be able to justify any knowledge claim.[11]

Reymond moreover "would agree that, without innate self–evident truths and without a revelational pou sto as a given, the justification of knowledge is impossible,"[12] and thus concludes:

The Church cannot expect to know the fullest blessing of God upon its evangelistic endeavors until it sets aside all accommodations to the autonomy of unbelieving man and insists, in conjunction with the proclamation of the Reformed gospel, that the authority of the word of the self–attesting Christ of Scripture is the only ground sufficiently ultimate to justify human truth claims, and that until His word is acknowledged as authoritative and placed at the basis of a given human knowledge system, that system remains unjustified and no truth assertion within it can be shown to have any meaning at all.[13]

John Robbins also makes important distinctions regarding knowledge:

There are three sorts of cognitive states: knowledge, opinion, and ignorance. Ignorance is simply the lack of ideas. Complete ignorance is the state of mind that empiricists say we are born with: We are all born with blank minds, tabula rasa, to use John Locke's phrase. (Incidentally, a tabula rasa mind - a blank mind - is an impossibility. A consciousness conscious of nothing is a contradiction in terms. Empiricism rests on a contradiction.) At the other extreme from ignorance is knowledge. Knowledge is not simply possessing thoughts or ideas, as some think. Knowledge is possessing true ideas and knowing them to be true. Knowledge is, by definition, knowledge of the truth. We do not say that a person "knows" that 2 plus 2 is 5. We may say he thinks it, but he does not know it. It would be better to say that he opines it.

Now, most of what we colloquially call knowledge is actually opinion: We "know" that we are in Pennsylvania; we "know" that Clinton - either Bill or Hillary - is President of the United States, and so forth. Opinions can be true or false; we just don't know which. History, except for revealed history, is opinion. Science is opinion. Archaeology is opinion. John Calvin said, "I call that knowledge, not what is innate in man, nor what is by diligence acquired, but what is revealed to us in the Law and the Prophets." Knowledge is true opinion with an account of its truth.[14]

In order to possess the truth, you have to know that your belief is true. That is Justified True Belief, and that is why Gary Crampton, a professor at Whitefield Theological Seminary, argues that

An important part of the Scripturalist worldview is the epistemological distinction between knowledge and opinion. Throughout the history of Western thought, philosophers such as Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle, have correctly differentiated between these two. Augustine and Gordon Clark are just two examples of Christian philosophers who have done the same. There is a difference between that which we “know” and that about which we may have opinions.

In the Scripturalist worldview, knowledge is not only possessing ideas or thoughts; it is possessing true ideas or thoughts. Knowledge is knowledge of the truth. It is justified true belief. Only the Word of God (that which, as the Westminster Confession [1:6] says, “is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture”) gives us such knowledge.

Opinions, on the other hand, may be true or false. Natural science is opinion; archaeology is opinion; history (with the exception of Biblical history) is opinion. In these disciplines we are not dealing with “facts.” In them there is no justified true belief. To “opine” something is not to “know” it. Justified truth is found only in the Word of God.[15]

Crampton also highlights what Jason misconstrues: that Clark's definition of knowledge as a mind's possession of truth is JTB, because possessing the truth requires not just a true belief/opinion, as Jason claims, but also an account of its truth from Scripture. Otherwise it's just an opinion that happens to be true.

Jason claims that Clark defined knowledge as only true belief because he equates “true belief” with “possession of truth by a mind”—which Clark never did. Jason fails to cite where Clark rejected JTB or defined knowledge as true belief; the only source he gives is one of Clark’s obscure encyclopedic articles on knowledge[16] whom hardly anyone knows about, much less read, and the article itself makes no such claim. And from this foundation built on sand he denounces those who disagree, but not without sinking himself. Clark and many of his most prominent followers clearly affirm JTB, so is he ready to denounce Sean Gerety, Robert Reymond, John Robbins, Gary Crampton, and Clark himself as self-deceived Clarkians?

Notitia, Assensus, and…Faith?

There's yet another issue, more theological than philosophical. Throughout many of his writings, Clark emphasizes faith as an important doctrine, biblically clarifies what it means, and refutes deficient views. That’s why he wrote two treatises on it, Fa­­ith and Saving Faith and The Johannine Logos. In Faith and Saving Faith, Clark writes: "Faith and belief have been emphasized. Even apart from these introductory inducements the nature of saving faith is an important division of theology."[17] Clark’s treatment of faith is one of his major theological contributions. To disagree with his view of faith is significant, so much so that, if we follow Jason’s logic, it surely would not make you a “true” Clarkian.

Clark’s definition of faith is simple and biblical. In What Is Saving Faith? he explains that “Faith, by definition, is assent to understood propositions. Not all cases of assent, even assent to Biblical propositions, are saving faith, but all saving faith is assent to one or more Biblical propositions.”[18]

Clark consistently defines faith as understanding (notitia) with assent (assensus) throughout his writings, both published and unpublished. Note the complete absence of “trust” (fiducia). Some groundlessly accuse John Robbins of dishonestly altering Clark’s books—including Jason himself, who unfortunately parrots the views of his mentors from Whitefield Seminary, the president of which is Dr. Kenneth G. Talbot, and they have poisoned the well in Facebook groups to dissuade people from trusting Robbins and The Trinity Foundation,[19] which is by far the best and most reliable source of Gordon Clark’s thought and work. But in one of his unpublished papers on faith from the Gordon H. Clark Foundation—“a ministry of Whitefield College & Theological Seminary”—Clark cites Augustine’s definition of faith:

Augustine was probably the first to define faith. In his treatise Concerning the Predestination of the Saints he said, “Thinking is prior to believing… To believe is nothing other than to think with assent. For not all who think believe… but all who believe think; and they think believing and believe thinking.”[20]

And then agrees with him: “A person may know or understand a proposition and yet not believe it. To believe is to think with assent. Assent is an act of will: it is the voluntary acceptance of the proposition as true.”[21]

Even so, both Drs. Kenneth G. Talbot and W. Gary Crampton diverge from Clark's view of faith. Not only that, but in their book Calvinism, Hyper-Calvinism and Arminianism they claim that the “historical” view of faith which Clark believed and taught cannot justify:

First, not all faith is justifying faith. The Bible speaks of several kinds of faith, only one of which is genuine, justifying faith. Historical faith is one kind of non-justifying faith. All that is involved here is an historical assent to the truth claims of the gospel. As taught in James 2:19, even the demons have this kind of faith: “You believe that there is one God. You do well. Even the demons believe — and tremble!”[22]

But how is it that demons “assenting to the truth claims of the gospel” invalidates saving faith as believing—understanding and agreeing with—the gospel? Whether demons believe the gospel or not (they don’t) is irrelevant, because Christ died only for fallen man, not demons. Or is it because Talbot and Crampton debase it as a “non-justifying,” “historical” faith? The verse only says that the demons believe in one God, not that they believe the gospel. Clark repeatedly refuted this misapplication of James 2:19:

[The] argument here is that since the devils assent and true believers also assent, something other than assent is needed for saving faith [e.g. trust or fiducia]. This is a logical blunder. The text says the devils believe in monotheism. Why cannot the difference between the devils and Christians be the different propositions believed, rather than a psychological element in belief? [This] assumes a different psychology is needed. It is better to say a different object of belief is needed….[23]

It is illogical to conclude that belief is not assent just because belief in monotheism does not save. The clearer inference is that if belief in monotheism does not save, then one ought to believe something else in addition. Not assent, but monotheism is inadequate.[24]

And if Talbot’s and Crampton’s “historical” faith and “gospel-assenting” demons weren’t bad enough, they stray further still:

In justifying faith the believer appropriates and rests on Christ alone as Mediator in all his offices, based upon the divine testimony of God’s Word. Therefore, orthodox Christianity teaches that justifying faith involves three elements: knowledge (notitia), assent (assensus), and trust (fiducia). It is not enough to know the truth about Jesus Christ; nor is it sufficient merely to assent to the truth claims of the gospel (as in historical faith), as essential as these are. Saving faith is that which also whole-heartedly acquiesces to the Christ revealed in Scripture. Biblical conversion entails a whole-souled commitment. Justifying faith is a faith that makes a fiducial (i.e., a trusting) response to the gospel promises.[25]

But does not “whole-heartedly acquiesce” mean to “whole-heartedly” accept as true? How is this any different from assent? Merriam-Webster defines acquiesce as “to accept, comply, or submit tacitly or passively.” This is why Clark stressed that adding fiducia to faith is a tautology: “The crux of the difficulty with the popular analysis of faith into notitia (understanding), assensus (assent), and fiducia (trust), is that fiducia comes from the same root as fides (faith). Hence this popular analysis reduces to the obviously absurd definition that faith consists of understanding, assent, and faith. Something better than this tautology must be found.”[26]

Clark is one of very few theologians who tirelessly refuted the “necessity” of fiducia, the extra psychological element that many Protestants add to faith, as confused, meaningless, and redundant. Yet Crampton wrote an article called “Justification by Faith Alone” where he makes the same arguments listed above and heartily approves Jonathan Edwards’ discussion of trust (fiducia):

And clearly for Edwards, saving faith is one that involves trust (fiducia). Saving faith, he wrote, “is the whole soul’s active agreeing, according, and symphonizing with this truth [of the gospel].” It is an “adhering to the truth, and acquiescing in it.” It is an “embracing the promises of God, and fiducial relying on them, through Christ for salvation.” “There is a difference,” preached Edwards, in a sermon on Matthew 16:17, “between having a rational judgment that honey is sweet, and having a sense [taste] of its sweetness.” The same is true regarding saving faith: There is “a true sense of the divine and superlative excellency of God and Jesus Christ, and of the work of redemption, and the ways and works of God.” There is “a true sense of the divine excellency of the things of God’s Word [which] does more directly and immediately convince us of their truth.” When one has this “sense,” he acquiesces to the “light of the glorious gospel of Christ.”[27]

Clark also chided theologians who use analogies involving physical actions to represent “trust,” because faith is a purely internal, mental act of understanding and assenting to propositions. If it were a physical or external act, it would be a work. Here are more examples from Clark’s articles on faith, reason, and knowledge posted on the Gordon H. Clark Foundation:

The element of trust [fiducia], which Protestants emphasize, defies all explanation and remains in utter confusion. Illustrations, such as actually depositing money in a bank rather than merely believing that the bank is sound, depend on a physical action, in addition to the mental act of believing. Such additional external action is inappropriate to represent the thoroughly inner mental act of faith. Knowledge is an integral part of faith, and not its antithesis.[28]

………………………………………………………..

In describing the nature of faith, fundamentalists, evangelicals and even modernists in a certain way stress the element of trust. A preacher may draw a parallel between trusting in Christ and trusting in a chair. Belief that the chair is solid and comfortable, mere intellectual assent to such a proposition, will not rest your weary bones. You must, the preacher insists, actually sit in the chair. Similarly, so goes the argument, you can believe all that the Bible says about Christ and it will do you no good. Such illustrations as these are constantly used, in spite of the fact that the Bible says, “Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved.”[29]

………………………………………………………..

Is there such a thing as “mere belief,” or “mere intellectual assent?” Indeed, is there such a distinguishable phenomenon as a “mere” act of will? Intellectual assent is itself an act of will; and conversely, no volitional action could possibly take place without belief. If you will to eat ice cream, you must believe at least that there is some ice cream to be eaten. Intellect and will are not two separate “faculties”; rather they so interpenetrate in a single mental state that it is difficult and perhaps impossible not only to separate them in time but even in definition.[30]

Keep in mind that Clark’s published writings are weightier than his unpublished papers; there could be many reasons as to why he didn’t publish them. Nevertheless, Clark’s published material from The Trinity Foundation and unpublished papers from The Gordon H. Clark Foundation reveal the same mind at work—the exact same view of faith as understanding with assent and rejection of tautological trust. Talbot and Crampton have almost completely disregarded their mentor here. So if Jason will denounce Clarkians who affirm JTB and who attribute it to Clark, what’s to stop him from denouncing Drs. Talbot and Crampton who disregard Clark on such a vital issue as faith, and go as far as degrading Clark’s view to a “historical” faith that cannot justify?

Can the Blind Lead the Blind?

Our point is not to denounce Talbot, Crampton, and Jason as pseudo-Clarkians; our point is that Jason’s Diotrephesian demeaner betrays him. Not only did he denounce someone who didn’t accord with his own misrepresentations of Clark—exposing his own ignorance in the process—he has shown himself to be an unreliable source who’s not nearly as familiar with Clark as he claims to be. Jason evidently hasn't read much of Clark because he seems unfamiliar with a basic catalog of his publications. In his response to Luke Miner, for example, he claims that “there is a nature of man, and Clark wrote about this at length in many books, but perhaps most in depth, in his book, “What do Presbyterians Believe?” If one makes ontological statements, one cannot dismiss the term, ‘ontology.’ ”[31]

Jason refers to a 13-page chapter as "perhaps [Clark's] most in depth" discussion on man, even though Clark also wrote a 130-page treatise called The Biblical Doctrine of Man.[32] He rarely quotes Clark directly and misleadingly presents his own views as Clark’s. It’s hard to find primary source treatment of Clark’s works on his website or Facebook posts other than excuses as to why he can’t furnish citations. Jason has much to learn from men like John Robbins, whom he would do well to read rather than malign: “One of the characteristics of a competent historian [and teacher, scholar, etc.] is his practice of citing primary sources for his statements. If he makes an assertion about a person's views, for example, he quotes the words of that person. He does not merely quote or cite someone else, especially an opponent or critic of that person.”[33]

Instead of self-aggrandizing our platforms to lord it over others, and making false, unjustified (pun intended) assertions without substantiating references to push self-promoting agendas and those of schismatic seminary faculties—we need humility to sharpen and be sharpened by our peers.

There’s more to this than a petty Facebook scuffle. It’s about the damage being done to Clark and his followers by self-proclaimed experts who misrepresent and promote factious agendas that slander, defame, and undermine the valuable, edifying work of other Clarkians and their ministries. We can and should seek to be of one mind as Christians, especially if we share similar Reformed convictions and appreciation for one of the greatest Christian philosophers and theologians of all time. But it will not happen until Jason and those like him take heed and repent.

Imperious Presbyterians [and Christians from any denomination] seriously err in their emphasis by behaving as if authority is the essence of ecclesiastical office, rather than service.

Sadly, there is a Scriptural example pertaining to the distorted outlook of the Imperious Presbyterians. It is Diotrephes, who loved “to have the preeminence” (3 John 9) and abused his position to thwart the Apostle John. It is a tragic case when men in our day, professing to be Presbyterian pastors, exhibit more of the spirit of Diotrephes than of the Spirit of Christ and Paul.[34]

Semper Reformanda,

Carlos Montijo and Tim Shaughnessy

Postscript

1/10/2016 - Last night, Jason posted the following on the Clarkian Apologetics Facebook group:

Jason L. Petersen 10 hrs · Pensacola, FL

Thank you all for your support in this group. We are very, very, appreciative of your participation and understanding concerning the rules that we have laid out. At some parts of this post, I will be repeating what has been told to me by the Foundation, and at other parts, I will be speaking for myself.

Unfortunately, the Gordon Clark Foundation has concluded that the format we have chosen for this group will not work either. At first, we allowed for a discussion group that also would allow the admins to post content that we think is informative and edifying for the group. Unfortunately, there were some who just wanted to pick a fight.

After having issues with people who wanted to pick a fight on social media, we decided to change the format so that some discussion would be had. We laid out a very specific and strict set of rules. Unfortunately, some did not wish to adhere to the rules, and instead of respecting the intentions and rules of the group, they sought to teach everyone that the information we provided was not trustworthy. This was set to be a sort of classroom-like setting, but the tools given to us on Facebook is not enough to support such a format.

Now, I personally have made some mistakes in this group. First, I blocked two people that I still maintain respect for when it was not necessary. Second, I publicly stated that John Robbins edited Dr. Clark's work on faith without having the resources immediately at the ready. I personally apologize and repent for both of these things.

I'd also like to say that I am not one that is officially a part of the Gordon Clark foundation. I am endorsed by the foundation, but I simply help out. With all of the feuds that has started with some individuals from the Gordon Clark Discussion Group, it has been determined that a format such as this is not appropriate for the foundation.

At this time, we plan to start a new group. There will be no members (except for admins) allowed in this group. The group will be open to the public. The public may choose to read the content that we post or ignore it. The goal of the Gordon Clark Foundation is to get Clark's writings, published and unpublished out into the open. One issue that surfaces when one is trying to achieve this goal is that there may be some who may add a thought (be it in an apparent agreement or disagreement) that is not exactly what Dr. Clark believed. The main goal of the foundation in starting a group like this was to get the content from the Foundation out there. Ricky W. Roldan and I were the main participants, but the actual members of the Foundation did not participate very much because they did not like the way the format was working out. There are a few very qualified individuals that have expressed a willingness to help out in producing content for the Foundation, but some have held back because they do not want to risk getting involved in a time-wasting social media debate.

Therefore, we will start a new group where people can either choose to read Dr. Clark's articles and our own musings, or ignore us entirely.

As for this group, I will either take it over myself from the Foundation, or I will remove it from Facebook. I am not entirely sure of what I wish to do with it yet (I would appreciate some feedback on it).

Although there have been a lot of people who have speculated that our intention is to censor the ideas of others, and that we are "not teachable," and other bad things, many of you have been very supportive and expressed a desire for the type of format that we have now. I am very sorry that it did not work out. The choice we faced was either to let the group spin out of control and undermine the intentions that we had when we started the group, or to remove people (as we did) for violating the rules, and then allow them to speculate about and misconstrue our intent for removing them. For us, this is truly a no-win situation. The only thing to do is to create a new group and go from there.

I thank you all again. You have been a great encouragement. I will post more information in this group when I have it. Blessings.

Jason’s prompt response appears to be a step in the right direction; we look forward to working things out with him.

4/1/2017 - Jason has reached out to us and made amends, and we're discussing these matters with him in a spirit of brotherly love and hope to interview him on Semper Reformanda Radio soon. He no longer believes that John Robbins altered Gordon Clark’s books and appears to lean towards knowledge as Justified True Belief as well (see http://answersforhope.org/39-distinguish-knowledge-opinion/).

Notes

[1] Jason Petersen, "A Conversation with Luke Miner," Answers for Hope, 30 Dec 2015, accessed 1 Jan 2016, http://answersforhope.org/a-conversation-with-luke-miner/

[2] Petersen, http://answersforhope.org/a-conversation-with-luke-miner/. Jason eventually kicked out Tim Shaughnessy from the Facebook group for questioning his unfounded claim that Robbins allegedly altered Clark’s books.

[3] Petersen, http://answersforhope.org/a-conversation-with-luke-miner/.

[4] Gordon H. Clark, An Introduction to Christian Philosophy, in The Works of Gordon Haddon Clark, Volume 4 (Unicoi, TN: The Trinity Foundation, 2004), p. 300-301. Bold emphasis ours. Quoted in Sean Gerety's comment on 26 April 2007, "Must Clarkians use some Emperical Analysis & Inductive Reasoning?", Puritan Board, http://www.puritanboard.com/showthread.php/20726-Must-Clarkians-use-some-Emperical-Analysis-amp-Inductive-Reasoning/page2

[5] Clark, An Introduction to Christian Philosophy, p. 322. Bold emphasis ours. Quoted in Sean Gerety, "Biblical Epistemology 101," God's Hammer, 27 Jan 2013, https://godshammer.wordpress.com/2009/01/24/ink-marks-on-a-page/

[6] Gordon H. Clark, "Plato's Theory of Knowledge," The Gordon H. Clark Foundation, accessed 1 Jan 2016, http://thegordonhclarkfoundation.com/platos-theory-of-knowledge-by-gordon-h-clark/

[7] Gordon H. Clark, Lord God of Truth (Hobbs, NM: The Trinity Foundation, 1994), p. 40. Bold emphasis ours. Thanks to CJay Engel for finding this quote. For "a reasonably complete proof that Gordon Clark did, indeed, consistently use the term “knowledge” distinctly from true belief (or true opinion)," see his and Luke Miner’s article, "Gordon Clark and Knowledge: On Justification," http://scripturalism.com/gordon-clark-and-knowledge-on-justification/

[8] See a Google Books Ngram Viewer analysis of "justified true belief" from 1500 to 1985 at https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=justified+true+belief&case_insensitive=on&year_start=0&year_end=1985&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t4%3B%2Cjustified%20true%20belief%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3Bjustified%20true%20belief%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BJustified%20True%20Belief%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BJustified%20true%20belief%3B%2Cc0

[9] Sean Gerety, "Biblical Epistemology 101," God's Hammer, 27 Jan 2013, accessed 3 Jan 2016, https://godshammer.wordpress.com/2013/01/27/biblical-epistemology-101/

[10] Sean Gerety, "Ink Marks on a Page," God's Hammer, 24 Jan 2009, accessed 3 Jan 2016, https://godshammer.wordpress.com/2009/01/24/ink-marks-on-a-page/

[11] Robert L. Reymond, The Justification of Knowledge: An Introductory Study in Christian Apologetic Methodology (San Jose, CA: Pacific Institute of Religious Studies, 1998), p. 68, http://www.sgbcsv.org/literature/JustificationOfKnowledge.pdf.

[12] Reymond, Justification of Knowledge, p. 70.

[13] Reymond, Justification of Knowledge, p. 100.

[14] John W. Robbins, "An Introduction to Gordon H. Clark," The Trinity Review (July/Aug 1993), http://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=192. Emphasis ours.

[15] W. Gary Crampton, "Scripturalism: A Christian Worldview," The Trinity Review 299 (March/May 2011), http://trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=276. Bold emphasis ours. See also Crampton’s The Scripturalism of Gordon H. Clark (Jefferson, MD: The Trinity Foundation, 1999), p. 46:

An important part of Gordon Clark’s epistemology is his distinction between knowledge and opinion. There is a difference between that which we know and that which we opine. Knowledge is not only possessing ideas or thoughts; it is possessing true ideas or thoughts. Knowledge is knowledge of the truth; it is justified true belief. Only the Word of God (that which “is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture”) gives such knowledge.

[16] Gordon H. Clark, "Know, Knowledge," The Gordon H. Clark Foundation, accessed 6 Jan 2016, http://thegordonhclarkfoundation.com/know-knowledge-by-gordon-h-clark/

[17] Gordon H. Clark, "What Is Saving Faith?", The Trinity Review 206 (Jan/Feb 2004), http://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=102

[18] Gordon H. Clark, What Is Saving Faith? (Unicoi, TN: The Trinity Foundation, 2004), p. 88, http://www.trinitylectures.org/what-is-saving-faith-p-60.html. Emphasis ours. This book combines Faith and Saving Faith and The Johannine Logos into one volume.

[19] On 26 September 2015, we messaged Dr. Kenneth Talbot privately to inquire about his attacks on John Robbins. He thanked us for expressing our concern but declined to comment. Here’s what Tim asked:

My friend Carlos and I have strongly considered attending your school in the future and I am grateful for your presence in the ministry of Christ. I count you as a brother in the Lord and have benefitted from you personally. That’s why I find this difficult now.

I want to approach this carefully and respectfully, but I feel that I need to say something. I have recently found myself discouraged and even troubled to some extent by the way you speak about John Robbins and the Trinity Foundation. I have heard you speak negatively of Robbins and the TF in the past and have ignored it. Recently on Jason Petersen’s wall you said the following:

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This is not the first time I have heard you say something like this and I am disturbed by it. I don’t know anything really about Cheung but I find it surprising that you would say such things about Robbins.

I have benefited greatly from Dr. Robbins’ writings and the Trinity Foundation which has been committed to keeping and defending the legacy of Dr. Clark. I have used Dr. Robbins’ work in my own writings and have a high regard for the man. I don’t share in your assessment of Robbins or the TF and I wanted to know if this is the impression you give your students. I should also tell you that when I first heard of your school I asked Tom Juodaitis about it and he affirmed that it was the only school that was favorable to Clark and he had nothing negative to say about you or your school. I will not have time to reply back to you right now but I look forward to hearing from you.

You can also check out my writing and see if it reflects the type of attitude you have a problem with.

God Bless, Tim

Here’s what I (Carlos) asked:

Dr. Talbot you criticized Robbins publicly so we didn't think you'd have a problem giving details. Isn't the attitude you express against him the same attitude you're accusing Robbins of? Why would you defame a man who loved Clark and dedicated his life to promoting and preserving his legacy? Clark obviously held Robbins in high regard if he asked him to finish his book [The Incarnation] on his deathbed. It sounds like you're slandering him. I don't understand why you defame Robbins and the Trinity Foundation—who defend and promote Clark—while you also affiliate with people who criticize Clark and have no regard for him like Joel McDurmon [listen to “An interview of Joel McDurmon: Researcher and Writer for American Vision”] and Jeff Durban, who had Oliphint recklessly misrepresent Clark and falsely accuse him of heresy on his show (https://www.facebook.com/ApologiaRadio/posts/324063354406639).

These are some of the reasons Tim and I are no longer considering Whitefield Seminary, and no longer recommend it even though they're one of the few seminaries that incorporate Gordon Clark into their curriculum. For more information see Sean Gerety’s “Faith Is Understanding With Assent” and “Whitefield Follies,” as well as Luke Miner’s “Clark on Saving Faith in 1961.” There are still very strong misrepresentations–even slanders–of Clark today, particularly from Van Tilians. Here are a few examples from Scott Oliphint, Apologia Radio, and Reformed Forum:

• https://www.facebook.com/groups/CFDD1/permalink/791646060853020/

• https://www.facebook.com/ApologiaRadio/posts/324063354406639

• http://reformedforum.org/podcasts/ctc163/

• http://www.apologiaradio.com/?p=482

[20] Gordon H. Clark, "Faith," The Gordon H. Clark Foundation, accessed 3 Jan 2016, http://thegordonhclarkfoundation.com/faith-by-gordon-h-clark/

[21] Clark, "Faith," http://thegordonhclarkfoundation.com/faith-by-gordon-h-clark/

[22] Kenneth G. Talbot and W. Gary Crampton, Calvinism, Hyper-Calvinism and Arminianism: A Theological Primer, 3rd ed. (1990), p. 112. To request the free ebook version, see http://whitefieldmedia.us4.list-manage1.com/subscribe?u=2209ac66c06c8383a9ce36dfd&id=f5a1e983ce

[23] Clark, What Is Saving Faith?, p. 152.

[24] Clark, What Is Saving Faith?, p. 153.

[25] Talbot and Crampton, Calvinism, Hyper-Calvinism and Arminianism, p. 114. See also John Robbins’ “R. C. Sproul on Saving Faith,” http://trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=238. Talbot and Crampton’s view of faith is like Sproul’s.

[26] Gordon H. Clark, "Saving Faith", The Trinity Review (Dec 1979), http://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=10

[27] W. Gary Crampton, “Justification by Faith Alone,” A Puritan’s Mind, accessed 31 Dec 2015, http://www.apuritansmind.com/justification/justification-by-faith-alone-by-w-gary-crampton-th-d/

[28] Clark, "Know, Knowledge," http://thegordonhclarkfoundation.com/know-knowledge-by-gordon-h-clark/

[29] Clark, "Faith and Reason," http://thegordonhclarkfoundation.com/faith-and-reason-by-gordon-h-clark/. Emphasis ours.

[30] Gordon H. Clark, "Faith and Reason," The Gordon H. Clark Foundation, accessed 6 Jan 2016, http://thegordonhclarkfoundation.com/faith-and-reason-by-gordon-h-clark/. Emphasis ours.

[31] Petersen, http://answersforhope.org/a-conversation-with-luke-miner/

[32] Gordon H. Clark, The Biblical Doctrine of Man, 2nd ed. (Jefferson, MD: The Trinity Foundation, 1992), http://www.trinitylectures.org/biblical-doctrine-of-man-the-p-50.html

[33] John W. Robbins, Can the Orthodox Presbyterian Church Be Saved? (Unicoi, TN: The Trinity Foundation, 2004), p. 13, http://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=232

[34] Kevin Reed, “Imperious Presbyterianism,” The Trinity Review (June/Aug 2008), http://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=254v